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Summary
A low carbon future poses the question, how will low carbon technology be
integrated? One possibility is to retain back-up conventional generators. Other
possibilities are technical energy storage, and for demand side management to
play a more important role. With the advent of smart metering it is possible
consumers could be given real-time prices from their energy supplier.
If energy storage is to be implemented investors and stakeholders must have
an idea of the likely revenues. Chapter 1 estimates arbitrage revenues for a
small price taking store in a GB 2050 electricity market scenario. We do so
be estimating equilibrium market prices, which provide us with a market based
approach to valuation. It also estimates the effect that the characteristics of the
store, and market concentration has on revenues.
If energy storage is to be installed in enough capacity to smooth out large
fluctuations in net demand then the economics of a small, price taking, store are
no longer valid. An energy store would become a strategic player in the market
and a Nash equilibrium between generators and the store must be reached.
Chapter 2 proposes a methodology for estimating large scale energy storage
strategies and revenues, and estimates them.
Chapter 3 then turns to address time-of-use (TOU) tariffs. One potential
threat to TOU tariffs is the fear they will lead to winners and losers and that
they may be regressive or affect certain sectors of society more than others.
Here we explore these issues by taking advantage of a unique data-set, the
Household Electricity Survey (HES). We analyse the distributional effects of
various revenue-neutral TOU tariffs which are designed to reflect the true cost
of meeting electricity demand. We perform this welfare analysis under both the
assumptions of no demand response and demand response respectively.
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Part I
Small Scale Energy Storage
Arbitrage in a 2050 GB Electricity
Market Scenario
1 Introduction
By 2020 the UK is set to provide 15% of its energy needs from renewable sources.
This is set to rise to 30% by 2030 and by 2050 CO2 emissions are set to be
reduced by 80% relative to 1990 levels 1. These renewable technologies including
solar, wind, and tide, among others, vary in their potential for power provision,
energy payback, and economic viability. However, a common feature of these
technologies is their non-dispatchable nature. This inherently leads to increased
volatility and uncertainty in energy supply, imposing real costs for distribution
and generation. This increased volatility potentially provides opportunities for
arbitragers to buy in times of excess supply and sell when generation is scarce.
Furthermore, the aims of private arbitragers and a benevolent system planner
should coincide. At times of highest demand, and so highest cost, an arbitrager
will want to sell, replacing the highest marginal cost producers. At times of
low demand, and so lowest cost, an arbitrager will want to buy, potentially
avoiding costly shutting down of generators as well as reducing the average
cost of generation.Whilst there are several potential sources of revenue for an
energy storage firm, including the short term operating reserve (STOR) market,
1DECC [2011].
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capacity market, and a range of ancillary services if the storage technology
permitted, we provide estimates of the likely returns to arbitrage. This provides
an idea of how low energy storage costs may have to become, or how large
earnings from other sources have to be in order for energy storage technologies
to become commercially viable. We therefore aim to estimate the potential
arbitrage returns to a small scale energy store for varying specifications of the
store in a future electricity market scenario. Given this optimisation we are
able to estimate how much each of the characteristics of the store: round-
trip efficiency, flow constraint, and storage level constraint affect the revenue
and capacity factor of the store. We estimate elasticities between arbitrage
revenue and storage characteristic, which is unique to this study. We also explore
how arbitrage revenues are affected by concentration in the wholesale electricity
market. This is something unique to this study and provides an idea of what
kinds of electricity market reform may be good or bad for arbitrage revenues.
We go beyond previous studies by explicitly modeling the market the storage
firm would be operating in. This allows us to estimate a time series of market
clearing prices in a 2050 GB electricity market scenario, for the energy stor-
age firm to maximise over. Importantly this provides us with market founded
spreads of electricity prices. This allows our estimates of energy storage’s value
as an arbitrager to be more market based than previous studies.
In order for us to estimate the likely returns to energy storage we must have
a price profile over which it can maximise. However, large scale renewable gen-
eration is not yet a reality and net demand is not as volatile as it may become.
Therefore, using current prices could be misleading. To combat this we compute
a supply function equilibrium (SFE) for a 2050 Great Britain (GB) electricity
market scenario. Supply function equilibrium was chosen rather than other
forms of competition, such as Cournot, since it has been shown in Willems,
10
Rumiantseva, and Weigt (2009) to approximate electricity market prices bet-
ter than competing models. Cournot, for example, tends to overestimate the
markup. We apply the supply function equilibrium to 2050 GB stylised electric-
ity demand which provides us with prices over which the store can maximise.
Valuations of the store’s worth and its potential for smoothing are then cal-
culated from these optimisation results. Section 2 introduces SFE in greater
detail, and section 4 explains the empirical strategy.
Firstly, a note on what we mean by energy storage. Traditionally energy stor-
age has been provided by pumped hydroelectric energy storage such as Dinorwig
in the UK, and Bath County Pumped Storage Station in the US. However, the
installation of pumped hydro is limited by the availability of suitable locations.
There are, however, many other potential energy storage technologies such as
compressed air energy storage (CAES), seasonal thermal stores, hydrogen, and
batteries, among others. Here we do not specify a specific technology but in-
stead treat storage as a ’black box’ for which we can set the parameters. Certain
mixes of these parameters will describe certain storage technologies. We can also
consider these results as a slightly different form of energy storage - demand side
management. Just like technical energy storage there are constraints on how
much can be curtailed (stored) each hour, and constraints on just how much
can be postponed in total at any one point in time. Although not a construc-
tive demonstration of demand side management where consumers would equate
the marginal rate of substitution between energy use and curtailment, and the
price of doing so, it does perhaps capture one aspect well. That is the idea
that whatever is curtailed now must be executed later, and perhaps to a greater
extent than it would have been before. For example domestic heating could
be postponed and room temperature kept within designated limits. However,
when it is eventually heated it may take more energy to return it to a desired
11
temperature than if a constant temperature had been sustained throughout. In
effect heating or some other use of electricity could take the form of a convex
function. This is captured here by input and output efficiency.
Why might energy storage be beneficial in a low carbon future? There are
times when renewable energy production falls substantially and potentially for
sustained periods requiring either some sort of net demand management or spare
generation capacity (see figure 20 for a time series of renewable output scaled
up from 2009-10 to 2050 levels). Curtailment of renewable energy also occurs
occasionally due to the ramping constraints of conventional generators. This is
where conventional generators are prepared to pay or accept very low prices in
order to keep on producing so as to avoid costly ramping. This could be avoided
with storage. One alternative to storage or demand management is the use of
inter-connectors. Creating a larger, more integrated grid is of benefit for a vari-
ety of reasons, as are explained in Archer & Jacobson (2007)., however weather
systems can stretch across large areas of Europe. There is therefore only lim-
ited scope for diversifying renewable generation risk across countries (Andrews,
2015). However, there is the potential to diversify risk between countries with
a large penetration of renewables and those with extensive hydroelectric and
pumped storage capacity. Green and Vasilakos (2012), for example, analyse
electricity trade between Denmark and other Nordic countries, and find that
by internationally trading electricity they are able to optimally deal with inter-
mittency in wind generation. There are however constraints on the capacity of
inter-connectors and they size of fluctuations they can manage. Storage there-
fore may be able to offer improved security of supply given the shortcomings of
other methods of risk minimisation.
Electricity storage is able to offer shorter term solutions such as balancing
and frequency services. These are potentially lucrative and have been evaluated
12
in the literature, for example by Black & Strbac (2006) & (2007), Pelacchi &
Poli (2010), and Paatero & Lund (2006) & (2007). The remit of this paper is
different however, in that it is addressing the viability of energy storage as an
arbitrager.
Some previous studies have analysed the overall system value of arbitraging
energy storage in Great Britain by looking into how energy storage could be used
to minimise the cost of generation. This is done by storing when the marginal
cost of energy production is low, and releasing when the marginal price is higher,
for example when the marginal plant is very high marginal cost and the starting
up cost of the plant may also have to be recovered in the wholesale market. This
leads to potentially very high marginal costs of production. Grünewald et al.
(2011) analyses the role of an arbitraging large scale energy store in a GB low
carbon future.
The Energy Research Partnership (2011) similarly explores energy arbitrage
in the UK. However, their focus is primarily on energy storage’s ability to provide
a reliable energy supply in the face of large penetration of renewables, but in
particular in pathways to achieving the UK’s emissions goals. They find that
energy storage can help to manage the large-scale deployment of renewable
generation, and also the electrification of space heating2. They also find storage
has the potential to substitute for new peaking generation plant, and also help
the transmission system handle increasing power flows. However, they do find
that energy storage technologies are unlikely to be deployed on a large scale
under current market and regulatory conditions. They recommend that both
storage technology cost reductions, and a market and regulatory framework
which recognises the benefits energy storage brings (such as security of supply,
ancillary services, and system inertia). However, they do point out that since
energy storage is an enabling technology its potential role will be defined by
2Currently space heating is primarily met by gas in the UK.
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developments across the energy system.
In this analysis we go further by estimating equilibrium market prices, in a
defined future energy scenario, for the storage firm to maximise over rather than
storage taking up spare renewable output. Previous literature has also assessed
the potential returns to energy storage from the investors viewpoint. Partic-
ularly from arbitrage in the US. For example, Drury, Denholm, and Sioshansi
(2011) value the possibility of energy storage providing operational reserves,
and arbitraging in several US markets. Sioshansi et al. (2009) also estimates
the arbitraging profit of an energy store, however in Pennsylvania-New Jersey-
Maryland (PJM).
Byrne and Silva-Monroy (2012) analyse the potential profit of energy storage
with combined services provision in California Independent System Operator
(CAISO). However, they do so by using historic market prices with perfect
information. However, as Teng (2015) notes, in a future system with high
renewable generation penetration, electricity prices would become more volatile,
as well as uncertain. Here we attempt to tackle the first of these critiques.
There has also been considerable research into the value of co-location,
and co-ownership of storage and intermittent electricity sources for example
Sioshansi (2011), Madaeni, Denholm, and Sioshansi (2011) who look at the
added value of storage in connecting transmission connected renewable gener-
ation in places with high load factors to demand centres. Research has also
aimed to asses how well storage can be used to improve the value of intermit-
tent renewable generation, for example Solomon et al. [2010], and Wilson et al
[2010]. Gill et al. (2013) have also explored how energy storage can be used to
increase the revenue of non-firm wind generation. While we concentrate here on
arbitrage it is possible that stores would diversify their revenue streams to incor-
porate balancing and frequency services along with arbitrage, and the capacity
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market.
Strbac et al. (2012) explore multiple-service provision from energy storage.
They take a whole-systems approach to estimating the value of storage, and
as such tend to find values higher than those suggested by previous research.
These include savings in generation capacity, interconnection, transmission, and
distribution networks as well as savings in operating costs. They find that the
relative share of each of these savings changes greatly over time, and is different
across assumptions taken. Generally the value of storage is greatest in scenarios
with high renewable generation shares. This is a result of storage being able
to be used to reduce the amount of renewables curtailment. They also find
that storage is at its most valuable when peak shaving, and so storage duration
greater than 6 hours become of little value. They also find that distributed
energy storage is of significant value in reducing distribution network reinforce-
ment expenditure. However, they do note that the demands placed on storage
to achieve each of these goals varies greatly, and it would be likely that sev-
eral storage technologies would be needed to achieve the full suite of benefits of
storage.
stoRE (2013) and Tuohy and O’Malley (2011) also investigate multiple-
service provision from energy storage. stoRE (2013) analysed how energy stor-
age could be used to facilitate high penetration of renewable generation in Ger-
many. However, Tuohy and O’Malley (2011) use stochastic scheduling to cal-
culate the optimal split of energy storage capacity between activities. They
do so for arbitrage and ancillary service provision under a variety of system
conditions. This is particularly useful under high renewable penetration since
generation is inherently stochastic.
In addition, the ’Smarter Networks Storage’ project (2016) provides evidence
of the capability of grid scale battery storage and its ability to serve multiple
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revenue-earning streams. The trials, which commenced in 2014, offers evidence
of how grid scale battery storage can be deployed within the GB electricity
system. While they find frequency response the best the most profitable appli-
cation currently, one issue it addresses is their ability to to accomplish different
objectives at the same time. They demonstrate that many activities can over-
lap, for example, local distribution congestion management, triad avoidance,
and national peak shaving. As such they conclude that contracts for storage
services should allow deployment for multiple applications to support business
cases.
While most of the literature we have discussed relates to system-wide and
transmission level usages of storage, the literature has also assessed how energy
storage can be used at distribution level. Pudjianto et al. (2014) shows the
benefits of energy storage in supporting the distribution network. That is in
managing constraints on the distribution network.
Teng et al. (2015) also analyse the advantages of energy storage in the dis-
tribution network, however this time in analysing the value it might deliver to
investors. They do this for a range of objectives: energy and ancillary service
markets, revenue maximisation in the context of feed-in tariffs, and by facili-
tating reductions in carbon dioxide emissions. They find the key drivers for the
value of energy storage in this context are the parameters of the store itself, net-
work constraints, prices of energy and ancillary services, and the characteristics
of the energy system in which they are integrated.
16
2 The Model
Supply function equilibria (SFE) was first introduced by Klemperer and Meyer
(1989), and applied to the GB electricity market by Green and Newbery (1992).
Generators are assumed to compete in supply functions, that is a schedule of
quantities and prices offered to the market. This allows firms to be more flex-
ible than either choosing quantity (as in Cournot competition) or price (as in
Bertrand competition). In Klemperer and Meyer (1989) a supply function is
argued on the grounds of uncertainty in the demand function. Green and New-
bery (1992) showed this as equivalent as variation in the demand function from
changing demand conditions at different times of the day and week. Willems,
Rumiantseva, and Weigt, (2009) show that SFE provides a better approxima-
tion electricity markets in the long run than competing models of competition
such Cournot, and so we use SFE in order to estimate a supply function for the
GB electricity market.
In SFE, firms maximise profit subject to beliefs about the residual demand
function, which is assumed to be a linear function of price. The residual de-
mand function being gross consumer demand, net of other generators scheduled
quantity. An SFE therefore constitutes a Nash equilibrium between the large
generators in the market and is the sum of best responses for different realisa-
tions of the demand function. Firms maximise their own profit function:
pi(p, t) = p
D(p, t)−∑
j 6=i
qj(p)
− Ci
D(p, t)−∑
j 6=i
qj(p)
 (1)
where p denotes the market price at each point in time, and D(p, t) −∑
j 6=i qj(p) is the residual demand faced by the ith firm at time t. Finally,
Ci(q) is the total cost for firm i of producing q units of electricity. The first
order condition leads directly to the supply function:
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qi(p) =
(
p− C ′i (qi (p))
)−δD
δp
+
∑
j 6=i
δqj
δp
 (2)
This can be simplified by taking the symmetric case where all generators
are the same size with the same cost function. Evans and Green (2005) show
this is a good approximation for a linear case where exact solutions exist. Like
Green and Vasilakos (2010) we assume 6 symmetric firms for our base case and
is derived from the inverse of the Herfindahl Index. This implies little change
in concentration from current levels, however, we do explore differing levels of
concentration in section (5.4).
The industry supply function, once calculated from the first order conditions
above, provides us with market price, market supply pairings. The demand
data, scaled to 2050 levels, and netted of 2050 renewable electricity production,
is then passed through the supply function in order to provide our 2050 time
series/schedule of prices. See section (5.1) for more detail.
We then maximise the revenue of a small scale price taking energy storage
operator over this price schedule. Optimisation is based upon the method de-
scribed by Connolly et al. (2011). The optimisation procedure is provided by
Edward Barbour3. We estimate returns for a variety of charging and discharg-
ing efficiencies4, flow, and storage capacity constraints. There is no technical
marginal cost to storage operations, for example a fuel cost. The main deter-
minants of storage operations should be the predicted spread, efficiency losses,
and the flow, and capacity constraints. The omission of technical marginal costs
should not affect our results greatly since it is equivalent to either a slightly
higher buy price, or slightly lower sell price, which is captured by the round-
trip efficiency. The storage firm then maximises revenue over the time horizon
3See Barbour et al. [2014], and www.energstoragesense.com
4Set equal for simplicity.
18
providing us with a storage and revenue profile. The storage firm is small rela-
tive to the market size and so we assume it is a price taker. The storage firm
therefore maximises profits given a price series:
max
T∑
t=1
ptq
s
t (3)
where qst is the quantity the storage firm either buys (-) from or sell (+) to
the market at time t.
Subject to:
q¯s > qst > q
s∀t ∈ T (4)
L¯s > Lst > 0∀t ∈ T (5)
where Lst is the level of the store at time t given input/output efficiencies of
ein and eout respectively.
It is important to note that in using SFE we are assuming the GB wholesale
electricity market is being operated as a pool, or a multi-unit auction and not
being operated as a bilateral auction as is the case today.
3 Data
In order to calculate a supply function equilibrium for a 2050 scenario we must
have a belief over future demand profiles. We therefore take aggregate electricity
demand data, provided by the National Grid5, for the UK at the half-hourly
level between the 1st of January 2011 and the first of January 2013 and scale
5See National Grid Data Explorer [2015].
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this up to 2050 levels in line with the central predictions of Ault et al. (2008).
This equates to 1.1% compound growth per year. However, w do not alter the
profile of demand to represent changes in consumption patterns as predicting
aggregate consumer demand profiles (both daily and seasonally) is beyond the
remit of this paper. Furthermore, an assumption made on the shape of daily or
seasonal demand would drive prices and associated storage revenues too much
for comfort. Whilst an assumption of unchanged electricity demand profiles is
potentially unrealistic, all that is important to an arbitrager is the spread and
timing of demand. If these remain roughly the same then our results are still
valid.
We do, however, want to take into account potential future net demand
volatility generated by the increased penetration of renewables. By 2050 40% of
the UK’s electricity needs are set to be supplied by renewables (DECC, 2011).
We therefore need some belief over half hourly renewable energy production and
so we take National Grid metered wind turbine generation 6 for the the same
time period. Weather conditions partly drive electricity consumption decisions
and so wind turbine output and consumer demand cannot be matched together
ad hoc7.
Wind turbine generation is scaled up to 2050 installed capacity levels by the
ratio of 2050 generation capacity to installed capacity at each point in time8.
Wind turbine generation is then netted from demand. This provides us with
the net demand profile to be met by generators9.
6Data on other types of renewable generation were not available for the whole period.
Wind turbine generation also currently makes up the majority of UK renewable electricity
generation.
7 Table 9 in the appendix shows summary statistics of both observed demand, and renew-
able output.
8Information on installed wind turbine capacity was obtained from Renewable UK. See
http://www.renewableuk.com/.
9 See figures (18), (19), and (20) in the appendix for a time series of of gross demand, net
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It would be interesting to use higher resolution data, where we would be able
to explore arbitrage returns for managing short run net demand fluctuations
in ancillary markets. However, wind turbine generation is only measured at
the half hourly level, furthermore, short run wind turbine output volatility is
reduced when there is deeper renewable penetration (IEA, 2005).
In order to estimate the supply function equilibrium we must have a belief
on the composition of electricity generation in 2050 and so the marginal cost
function for electricity generation. We take DECCs MARKAL 3.26 analogous
scenario for 205010. Included in this is the predicted future composition of
electricity generation technologies. The corresponding marginal costs are taken
from DECC (2012) which include CO2costs priced at 2050 carbon prices. Figure
1 shows the marginal cost function for the industry as well as the equilibrium
supply function. The marginal cost function is step-wise increasing as the indus-
try moves along the merit order from low marginal cost technologies to higher
marginal cost ones, from nuclear to coal to gas.
The responsiveness of demand to price i.e. the partial derivative of the
demand curve with respect to price in equation 2, is taken as −123.92. This
is equal to the figure used by Green & Vasilakos (2011) scaled up to reflect
the growth in demand. Our resulting equilibrium prices imply an average price
elasticity of demand of approximately −0.18, which is possibly quite realistic in
a 2050 electricity market scenario where demand response technology is more
sophisticated than it is at the moment.
The last input is the specifications of the store. These are arbitrary but
reflect a wide range of possible round-trip efficiencies, flow constraints, and
demand, and wind turbine output. Intra-day and intra-week profiles are shown in figures 24
and 25, respectively.
10See AEA [2011], and DECC Calculator tool: http://2050-calculator-tool-
wiki.decc.gov.uk/pages/60.
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storage constraints for a future small scale energy store. They are summarised
in table 1. Optimal storage strategies were then computed for each of the 245
combinations of these specifications.
Table 1: Storage Specifications
Storage specification 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Round-trip efficiency (%) 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Flow constraint (MW) 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Storage constraint (MWh) 20 40 60 80 100
Summary statistics of the main variables used can be found in table 9 in the
appendix. All prices and costs are in 2012 pounds.
4 Empirical Methodology
In order to estimate energy storage returns we must first have realistic future
electricity market prices for the storage firm to maximise over. We therefore
estimate a supply function equilibrium for 2050 market conditions. In order to
do this we take a realistic starting point for the maximum price and quantity of
the SFE and then evaluate the slope of the supply function in equation 2. We
then iterate backwards along the supply function by moving along the supply
function and re-evaluating the slope until we reach a quantity of 0.
The starting price and quantity we take is the the Cournot equilibrium for
6 equally sized firms with an homogeneous cost function (shown in figure 1).
From there, given assumptions on marginal cost and the derivative of demand
with respect to price, the slope of the supply function in 2 is then evaluated.
This is simplified by the fact we assume 6 equally sized firms with common
marginal cost functions. We then assume the supply function takes the form
of a linear spline for small changes in quantity. The slope is the reevaluated at
22
this new point further down the supply function and the supply function is then
assumed to be linear for this small changes in quantity. This is repeated until
a quantity of zero is reached.
We then take the supply function data points in figure 2 and regress price on
quantity and its higher orders for each continuous portion in order to calculate
the supply function equation. We then pass net demand through this equation
to solve for the price at each point in time. This provides us with a realistic
time series of market based 2050 electricity market scenario prices for the price
taking energy store to maximise over.
The small scale energy storage firm then maximises over this price schedule,
for given specifications of the store. In order to do this we use the algorithmic
arbitrage maximisation method described in Connolly et al. (2011), and used
in Barbour et al. (2014). The procedure maximises profits from arbitrage given
specifications of round-trip efficiency, flow constraints, and storage constraints.
This is then repeated for all 245 combinations of these three variables. Lastly we
estimate how arbitrage revenues are effected by the level of competition in the
wholesale electricity market. We do this by repeating the procedure described
above for various different numbers of firms.
5 Results
The results section proceeds as follows. Subsection 5.1 presents the results of
the supply function equilibrium, and resulting price distributions. Subsection
5.2 presents examples of the storage optimisation algorithm and how the storage
firm maximises revenue. Subsection 5.3 shows how storage firm characteristics
affect arbitrage revenues and subsection 5.4 shows how varying the level of
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competition in the wholesale electricity market affects arbitraging revenue.
5.1 Supply Function
We estimate the industry supply functions from the best response function
(equation 2) and iteratively solve for the slope of the supply function, and
equilibrium price. We first take the largest net demand observation as a start-
ing point and compute the Cournot equilibrium. This gives us a point from
which to calculate the slope of the supply function in equation 2. We then take
a linear approximation of the supply function for a small change in quantity.
The equilibrium price is then found from the inverse demand function. The new
slope of the supply function is then calculated from the best response function
and a further linear approximation is taken. This is repeated until we reach the
lowest net demand realisation. Given the large penetration of wind there are
some, but not many, hours where net demand is negative. We only estimate
the supply function equilibrium over strictly positive values of demand as the
supply function equilibrium is only defined over positive realisations of demand.
In order to construct future price profiles we generate a mapping between 2050
net demand predictions and the equilibrium supply functions11.
Figure 1 depicts the resulting supply function and marginal cost function.
The supply function in figure 1 is discontinuous where marginal cost increases
and the marginal generation technology changes. Markups vary along the supply
function and increase with quantity demanded. Indeed, at the very highest
level of consumer demand markups reach 300%. However, what matters is
11 Figures 26 and 27 in the appendix show a time series and histogram of market prices
respectively.
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Figure 1: Supply Function
the distribution of demand around the supply function. Figure 2 shows the
distribution of net demand along the supply function. We can see that the
majority of the time net demand is at relatively low levels of markup. It is
only in the extreme right hand tail of the distribution that the supply function
increases rapidly. The figure also provides us with an idea of what the storage
firm is maximising over.
After passing net demand through the supply function we are left with a
time series of equilibrium market prices12.
12 Figures 26 and 27 in the appendix show a time series and distribution of the prices the
storage firm will maximise over.
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Figure 2: Supply Function and Net Demand Distribution
5.2 Storage Optimisation
Optimal storage arbitrage strategies were calculated as per the Connolly et al.
(2011) algorithm. This gives us the profit maximising strategies for all different
flow, storage, and efficiency parameters. Figure 3 shows what these optimal
strategies look like for a sub sample of 100 hours with round-trip efficiency 4,
flow constraint 4, and storage constraint 3.
In general the storage unit cycles once per day. For higher values of the
round-trip efficiency the storage unit begins to take advantage of smaller price
spreads, for example around half-hour 110 in the example above.
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Figure 3: Storage Operation
5.3 Arbitrage Returns
Arbitrage returns are calculated for all different specifications of the store 13. In
order to represent these results parsimoniously we run regressions of the profit
per year per MWh of storage capacity on the various specifications of the store14.
Table 2 shows results for the log-log specification:
We can see that round-trip efficiency has the largest single impact on profits.
A 1% increase in efficiency (not an increase of 1%) causes a 4% increase in profits.
Whereas flow constraint demonstrates diminishing returns. A 1% increase in
the flow constraint only results in a 0.36% increase in profit. The negative
13see table 1 for the stores various specifications.
14 For a graphical interpretation see figures 28 through 32 in the appendix for profits over
round-trip efficiency and flow constraint for each specification of the storage level constraint.
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Table 2: Log Profit Regression
(1)
VARIABLES ln Profit
lneff 8.995***
(0.0608)
lnflow 0.443***
(0.0146)
lnstor -0.328***
(0.0162)
Constant 9.344***
(0.0778)
Observations 245
R-squared 0.990
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
coefficient on store constraint of -0.248 is more intuitive than it appears since
profits are measured as profit per year per MWh of the storage level constraint.
Therefore what we are asking is how does increasing the storage level constraint
effect profit per MWh of the storage capacity. There are therefore diminishing
returns to storage level.
As round-trip efficiency is increased the storage firm is able to take advantage
of smaller spreads which would have been unprofitable with a lower round-trip
efficiency. As we can see from figure 19 that while netting off renewable output
from demand has given us a distribution with longer tails, the distribution is
relatively normal. Therefore, as the round-trip efficiency increases, the store
is able to increase the amount of hours for which it runs. Table 3 shows the
results of the regression of the proportion of the time horizon for which the
store is operating (capacity factor) on round-trip efficiency, flow constraint, and
storage level constraint. We can see that round-trip efficiency has a large effect
on increasing the capacity factor. A 1% increase in efficiency leads to a 2.73%
increase in the capacity factor.
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As the flow constraint is increased the storage firm is able to capitalise more
on given spreads for a given round-trip efficiency and storage constraint. How-
ever, they are still limited to maximising over the same spreads since the round-
trip efficiency is given, and are still hamstrung by the same storage constraint.
Table 3 shows that as the flow constraint increases we actually see the capacity
factor fall. This is why we observe this diminishing returns with respect to flow
constraint.
Finally, as the storage constraint is increased the store is able to charge and
discharge for longer, but is still constrained by the flow constraint for a given
round-trip efficiency. Hence the store exhibits diminishing returns with respect
to the storage level constraint. It is important to note that while a high capacity
factor is generally desirable, it could be that alternative revenue sources from
other markets make it desirable to have a relatively low capacity factor so as
to be able to take advantage of low hanging fruit in other markets, such as for
ancillary services.
Table 4 shows the results for a quadratic specification of the regression. Here
we get similar results in that round-trip efficiency has a convex shape and so
exhibits increasing returns, whereas flow and storage level constraints exhibit
diminishing returns.
See figures 33 through 37 in the appendix for a graphical interpretation of
how the three constraints affect operation times.
5.4 Competition
We are interested to discover how electricity arbitraging revenues are affected by
the level of competition in the market and to what extent. Intuitively arbitrage
revenues should have a direct relationship with the concentration in the market.
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Table 3: Log Capacity Factor Regression
(1)
VARIABLES ln Capacity Factor
lnefficiency 9.049***
(0.0801)
lnflow -0.456***
(0.0192)
lnstore 0.552***
(0.0214)
Constant -1.541***
(0.102)
Observations 245
R-squared 0.983
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The more competition in the market the less of a mark up is charged over
marginal cost. Since markup is positively related to the demand shock observed
we should expect a greater markup in times of peak demand than in times of low
demand. Limiting competition should therefore increase the spread of prices.
We construct supply functions for varying degrees of competition and opti-
mise storage for each combination of storage capacity, flow capacity, and effi-
ciency specifications. This affects the market by altering the intensity of com-
petition in the market and therefore the resulting equilibrium supply functions.
Figure 4 shows, for a subsection of the levels of competition considered, how the
supply functions are affected.
From figure 4 you can see that by reducing the number of generators, firms
are able to exploit their market power and charge a higher markup. However,
this markup is increasing in the quantity demanded. A storage firm should
therefore be able to generate greater arbitraging revenues when competition is
lower.
Table 5 shows this to be true. Here we regressed arbitrage profits on round-
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Table 4: Profit Regression
(1)
VARIABLES Profit
efficiency -132,077***
(6,959)
efficiency2 97,375***
(4,248)
flow 196.2***
(26.15)
flow2 -3.149***
(0.639)
store -29.04***
(10.11)
store2 0.0824
(0.0827)
Constant 43,972***
(2,821)
Observations 245
R-squared 0.948
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
trip efficiency, flow constraint, and storage level constraint, and their squares,
and dummy variables for each level of competition relative to a base case of
6 firms. Average profit under the 6 firm case is £3,783 per year per MWh of
storage capacity over all the specifications considered. We can see that reducing
competition to 5 firms is associated with a 49% increase in profits. Whereas
increasing competition to 7 firms diminishes profits by 26.7%. This provides
us with a reasonable prediction of how arbitraging energy storage firms may
be positively or adversely affected by energy market reform, consolidation, or
entry.
Arbitrage revenue per year per MWh of storage capacity for all 245 specifi-
cation combinations of the store are available upon request.
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Figure 4: Supply Function Comparison
6 Conclusion
If a low carbon economy based on intermittent generation is to work like ours
does currently, then a solution must be found to manage net demand volatility.
We explore one of those solutions here: that of technical energy storage. Whilst
energy storage technologies are still in their infancy, what is of vital importance
to its implementation is for investors and stakeholders, such as policy makers,
to have estimates and expectations of future earnings. Furthermore, energy
storage technologies come in many guises and have different characteristics. It
is therefore useful to have an idea as to the relative return to these various
characteristics. That is what this chapter has been focused upon. We provide
market founded estimates of the likely revenues an energy storage firm might
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Table 5: Log Competition Regression
(1)
VARIABLES ln Profit
lnefficiency 8.747***
(0.0443)
lnflow 0.319***
(0.0106)
lnstore -0.324***
(0.0118)
2 firms 1.530***
(0.0269)
4 firms 0.867***
(0.0269)
5 firms 0.402***
(0.0269)
7 firms -0.310***
(0.0269)
8 firms -0.527***
(0.0269)
10 firms -3.582***
(0.0269)
Constant 9.630***
(0.0593)
Observations 1,960
R-squared 0.978
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
make, and provide evidence on the relative return to each of the characteristic
of an energy store.
There has been relatively little previous research assessing energy storage’s
value in a future low carbon GB energy market. However, here we go beyond
those previous studies by estimating future energy market prices through a
supply function equilibrium. This provides us with a market founded time series
of future wholesale electricity market prices over which the store can maximise.
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Further to this, we also estimate the relative impact on revenues, in the arbitrage
market, of changing an energy store’s characteristics, and altering the level of
competition in the market. These are elements unique to this study.
Whilst we have focused our attention on profit maximising from arbitrage
there are various other services through which an energy store could derive value.
These include the STOR market, capacity market, and ancillary services, among
others. Further research in this area may try to marry these competing objec-
tives in order to provide overall values of storage. However, what we provide
here are robust estimates of one of the potentially more important storage ser-
vices, especially if technical storage is to play a large part in smoothing net
demand fluctuations.
In this chapter we have concentrated on private returns to storage, without
taking into consideration the externalities the operation of an energy storage
firm might entail. For example, improved security of supply, and lower levels
of capital investment in distribution and generation. Combined with future
evidence on the social return to storage, our estimates would provide a reliable
estimate of the likely scale of subsidy energy storage technologies may need.
That is if energy storage costs were not brought down to the levels needed for
private investment of energy storage to go ahead.
Stakeholders who may be interested in the research documented in Chapter
1 range from those aiming to reap the rewards of electricity arbitrage, such as
potential storage developers, to policymakers aiming to forecast the amount of
energy storage installed in future years. Our research demonstrates that under
a 2050 energy scenario with large amounts of variable renewable generation the
returns to pure arbitrage are still relatively small and are unlikely to provide
much of a business case for investment. Under our 6 generator scenario the
storage firms on average earned roughly £3,800 per year per MWh of storage
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capacity across our storage characteristics. As an illustrative comparison, the
cost of battery storage is forecast to come down to roughly $100/kWh of stor-
age capacity by 2050 (Rocky Mountain Institute, 2015). Therefore other value
streams or subsidy would be essential for storage to be able to be commercially
viable in 2050. This would be useful information for potential developers, but
also policymakers, including DECC and Ofgem, the energies regulator, trying
to forecast the penetration of storage in the electricity market in 2050.
Furthermore, our estimates of the relative returns to each characteristic of
storage: flow capacity; storage capacity; and round-trip efficiency give potential
developers an indication of the relative importance of each characteristic with
regard to energy arbitrage. It therefore provides a further indication of which
characteristics are most worthwhile developing.
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Table 6: Competition Regression
(1)
VARIABLES Profit
efficiency -137,426***
(12,868)
efficiency 2 105,592***
(7,855)
flow 256.2***
(48.36)
flow 2 -4.211***
(1.182)
store -34.91*
(18.70)
store 2 0.0927
(0.153)
2 firms 13,325***
(409.3)
4 firms 4,138***
(409.3)
5 firms 1,550***
(409.3)
7 firms -909.8**
(409.3)
8 firms -1,444***
(409.3)
10 firms -3,669***
(409.3)
Constant 42,285***
(5,223)
Observations 1,960
R-squared 0.698
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Part II
Large Scale Energy Arbitrage,
Information Structures and Market
Power
7 Introduction
Increasing penetration of low carbon electricity generation technologies inher-
ently leads to increased volatility and uncertainty in energy supply. Increased
volatility in net demand poses its own risk to system security, additional costs
to conventional generators of frequently ramping up and down, resulting in low
capacity factors for these generators. However, it also has the potential to pro-
vide opportunities for arbitragers to buy in times of excess supply and sell when
generation is scarce.
In a 2050 GB low carbon energy scenario there are potentially very large
swings in net demand, lasting for several days at a time15. One solution is to
have a large amount of fast acting generation capacity, which is used only inter-
mittently. Another solution may be the large scale deployment of energy storage
so as to smooth out these large swings in net demand. Previous studies includ-
ing Grünewald et al. (2011), Drury, Denholm, and Sioshansi (2011), Sioshansi
(2011), as well as the previous chapter have sought to establish the likely returns
to an energy arbitrager by looking at the operation of a price taking store and
estimating its likely returns under a variety of scenarios. However, if there was
15 Figure 19 in the appendix shows a time series of predicted future demand.
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large scale adoption of energy storage then it could end up providing a a large
share of power at times of peak net demand. Therefore the assumption that
storage is price taking may not be very realistic. We therefore propose a new
method of storage profit maximisation which considers how the store is affect-
ing the market price. We do this by characterising discrete market net demand
curves at each point in time16 and having the storage firm maximise over them,
given the actions of the generators. See section 9.1 for a description of the large
scale arbitrage model.
If we are to try and assess the likely revenues of a storage firm with mar-
ket power then we must consider what form of competition they are competing
under and what information structures are available to the players. Electricity
markets have been analysed using several forms of competition including Supply
Function Equilibrium (SFE)17, Bid Function Equilibrium18 (BFE), and compe-
tition in quantities, à la Cournot. Supply function equilibrium, where firms
compete in supply functions rather than price or quantity, is generally accepted
as being best able to approximate competition in the electricity market by most
closely estimating market clearing prices as shown by Willems, Rumiantseva,
and Weigt (2009) whereas Cournot competition tends to overestimate prices.
However, we are also interested in the information structures available to both
generators and the store. Specifically whether each player observes the actions
of the other competitors in other periods i.e. whether we have an open- or
closed-loop Nash equilibrium19. Ordinarily, with exogenous cost functions and
market demand there is no distinction between the two - profit maximisation at
each point in time would be temporally separable. However, the addition of a
16In our example this is at the hourly level.
17Klemperer & Meyer, [1989], Green & Newbery, [1992].
18See Crawford, Crespo, and Tauchen, [2006].
19See Fudenberg & Levine, [1988] for a discussion of the circumstances under which play
within these information structures are the same, and under what circumstances they are
different.
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large scale energy store with market power removes this temporal separability.
A conventional generator’s strategy today may indeed affect it’s own strategy
tomorrow through it’s affect on the operations of the store. There is then a
distinction between these two information structures.
In this chapter we propose a method to estimate the open-loop equilibrium
between the store and the conventional generators in the presence of imperfect
competition. We then go on to estimate the open-loop equilibrium for a large
energy store, and 6 conventional generators using a sub-sample of the data used
in chapter 1. We also propose a method to be able to estimate how generators
operate under a closed-loop information structure in the presence of a large-
scale store with market power. We do not estimate the closed-loop equilibrium
as a precise enough approximation to a relatively complex derivative is needed.
Subsection 9.2 elaborates in more detail.
In an open-loop model players do not observe the play of others, whereas in
a closed-loop model all past play is common knowledge. This leads to players
taking very different considerations in an electricity market with a large store.
In an open-loop game generators must only consider how their profit at each
time period is affected by their strategy today, given the decisions of the store
in that period. However, in a closed-loop game the generator observes the past
operation of the store, and therefore must consider how their strategy today
may affect storage decisions in upcoming periods, and so profits in the future.
Intuitively, a conventional generator will earn the majority of their profits
at times of peak demand, and so peak price and higher markups. A large scale
storage firm will operate, generally, by charging when generation is cheap, and
demand is low, and discharging when generation is expensive, and demand is
high20. If the store is large enough this will cause the price dispersion to fall,
20We only examine the possibility of large scale energy storage acting as a profit maximising
arbitrager.
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peak prices to be depressed, and off-peak prices to rise. This is not in the
generators’ interest. If the generators are able to think strategically, as they
would under a closed-loop equilibrium, they have the incentive to try to prevent
the store from discharging as much in times of peak demand. Intuitively they
may do this by withholding supply at times of low demand, thereby narrowing
the spread in prices the store takes advantage of. The store would therefore not
be capable of producing as much in times of peak demand and so less able to
depress the peak prices generators rely on.
In order to be able estimate an equilibrium we must set the players, and
these information structures, within a specific form of competition. Of the
three alternatives outlined above we choose Cournot competition. We do this
because of the tractability of competition in quantities, both theoretically and
in its computation. The estimation of strategies for a store with market power is
computationally challenging. Cournot makes estimation as tractable as possible.
In defining an equilibrium we must also consider the timing of players ac-
tions. All players move simultaneously and so we shall estimate the simultaneous
Nash equilibrium for the open-loop model. However, an additional method for
finding the simultaneous Nash equilibrium for the closed-loop model is proposed
in subsection 9.2 We estimate the open-loop equilibrium via a relaxation algo-
rithm whereby we iterate between the best responses of the generators, and the
store until a fixed point is reached. The reason we use a relaxation algorithm
is that we cannot analytically find the store’s best response function. The stor-
age algorithm operates by taking generator’s actions as given and maximising
over the remaining net demand functions. We must therefore use a relaxation
algorithm to iterate between the generators and the store. On each iteration we
are effectively asking the question ’How would the store react to this strategy?’,
’Can the generators now improve by altering theirs?’. The equilibrium algo-
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rithm is therefore going to proceed by asking the store how it would respond to
the generator’s strategy, and then computing how the generators would react
to that strategy until we reach a pair of stable strategies.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: section 8 details the theoretical
model for the open-loop equilibrium; section 9 outlines the empirical methodol-
ogy for estimating the large scale store’s strategies, and estimating the equilib-
rium itself; section 10 describes the data we are using and how it is constructed;
section 11 details the empirical results for the open-loop model; section 12 pro-
poses an extension which would allow for the estimation of a closed-loop equi-
librium; and section 13 concludes.
8 Model
In this section we outline the theory behind both the large scale store and
the Nash equilibrium computation in subsections 8.1 and 8.2 respectively. In
subsection 8.1 we shall focus on the large scale store model and the advantages
and limitations this implies. In subsection 8.2 we shall describe the open-loop
equilibrium, and the relaxation algorithm, the solution concept we shall be
using.
8.1 Large Scale Store
The aim of this large scale storage arbitrage maximisation algorithm is to de-
velop a model where the store is not a price taker, but instead will maximise
over a series of inverse net demand curves, therefore taking into consideration
how the store is impacting the market price. The store is necessarily forward
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looking since it is trying to maximise arbitrage revenues over a period of time.
The storage firm takes the decisions of the conventional generators as given and
then maximises over the net demand curves. Subsection 8.2 details how this
algorithm will fit within the equilibrium solution concept.
The storage firm maximises the sum of undiscounted profits over the time
horizon chosen, given net demand curves, and subject to the usual power, stor-
age capacity, and ramping constraints of a store. That is: the store can only
charge/discharge up to a given maximum; at any point in time the store can
only have so many MWh in storage; and the store can only increase/decrease
charging/discharging by a given amount each period (hour). The storage firm’s
problem can be defined as follows:
max
T∑
t=1
ptq
s
t (6)
where qst is the quantity the storage firm either buys (-) from or sell (+) to
the market at time t, and pt is a linear inverse demand function the arbitrager
is facing.
pt = at − b
(
N∑
i=1
qit + q
s
t
)
(7)
where qit is the output of generator i in period t, a is the inverse demand
intercept, and b is the gradient.
Subject to:
q¯s > qst > q
s∀t ∈ T (8)
L¯s > Lst > 0∀t ∈ T (9)
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∆qst,t−1 < q¯s∆ (10)
where q¯s and qs are the upper and lower limits on the store’s flow/power
constraint, Lst is the level of the store at time t, L¯s is the maximum MWh
capacity the store can hold, ∆qst,t−1 is the change in power between periods t−1
and t, and q¯s∆ is the ramping constraint. There are also a pair of input/output
efficiencies: ein, and eout respectively.
We are taking qit as given for all t ∈ T , and therefore what we are doing is
taking the partial derivative of the objective function with respect to qst ,∀t ∈ T
and maximising subject to the constraints. That is, we are computing the best-
response of the store, given the specific generator strategy profiles Q (but not
the best-response function).
In the proposed methodology for computing the Nash equilibrium between
conventional generators and the store we are going to be concentrating on two
different information structures, namely open- and closed-loop models. Sub-
section 8.2 will outline both equilibria in more detail, however we shall only be
able to consider the open-loop equilibrium for the store. This is due to modeling
constraints on the store, which are elaborated on in section 9.1. Effectively, the
store is not able to observe the past play of the conventional generators. This
means the store will not be considering how their decisions in time t impact the
generator’s play in future periods. While this is perhaps disadvantageous to the
store in a closed-loop equilibrium for the generators (the generators as a result
are assumed to have superior knowledge to the store), it is important to note
that this game has only become dynamic through the inclusion of the store. The
store’s strategies and profit making are heavily dependent on the strategies of
the generators - they are changing the store’s marginal costs and revenues with
their play. However, the generator’s profits and strategies in the future are only
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affected by the play of the store in period t through the generators considering
how that play affects the the store’s strategy in the future. The play of the
store in period t, for example, does not directly influence the marginal costs or
revenues of the generators in other periods given inter-temporal separability of
market fundamentals such as demand curve intercept, slope, and the marginal
cost of generation. We can therefore say that these closed-loop considerations
of the store are second-order compared with those of the generators.
The maximisation of the store would therefore not have these strategic con-
siderations imposed by a closed-loop information structure. If we were to allow
the store a closed-loop model their first-order-condition would be:
δpis
δqst
+
T∑
j=1
δpis
qit+j
δqit+j
δqst
= 0 (11)
By only allowing the store an open-loop model we are denying them the
second term in equation 11. However, the strategy of a generator in period t+ j
is not heavily dependent on the play of the store in the past period t. It is only
through the closed-loop considerations of the generators that the store’s actions
in period t affect the play of generators in period t + j. While it would be
interesting to explore these different information structures on the storage side
as well, we believe these closed-loop considerations are second-order compared
to those of the generators. Furthermore, in a closed-loop model the generators
only consider how their actions in period t are going to affect the store’s strategy
in periods t+ j Therefore, qit+j should only be an implicit function of qst given
the inter-temporal separability of cost functions.
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8.2 Nash Equilibrium
If we are to explore the strategies and returns to a large scale store capable
of affecting the market price, then we need set the store within a reasonable
market framework. This includes the way the firms in the market compete
and the type of information structure available to the players in the market.
We proceed by formulating the problem, and then go on to describe the two
information structures available to the players.
We consider a dynamic game with a finite set of discrete periods T =
{0, . . . , T}, and a finite set of players N = {0, . . . , N,N + 1}, where there are
N conventional firms (generators), and one arbitrager (store) who is able to
buy now and sell in the future. The generators, if producing, supply a strictly
positive quantity of an homogeneous good (electricity) to the T market de-
mand curves, and the store can both supply and demand to this inverse market
demand P =
{
P0(
∑N
i=1 q
i
0 + q
s
0), . . . , PT (
∑N
i=1 q
i
T + q
s
T )
}
, where s denotes the
store, and P denotes the inverse market demand function. The firms and store
compete à la Cournot. The market demand curve is linear, and it’s inverse is
specified as Pt = at − b
(∑N
i=1 q
i
t + q
s
t
)
given the same definitions of variables
as above.
The generators face common, exogenous, time specific marginal costs21. The
set of which is defined as C = {co, . . . , cT }. The arbitraging store does not face
any operational costs, but does face round-trip efficiency of storage es. For a
given amount of the good bought by the arbitrager only a constant proportion
es can be supplied in any future period where es ∈ [0, 1].The store naturally
a limit on the amount of the good it can store at any point in time, s¯, and
a limit on the amount it can buy or sell at any given point in time, q¯s. The
21A continuous marginal cost function could be used instead, however we simplify the
problem by pre-determining marginal cost.
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store therefore seeks to maximise undiscounted arbitrage revenue over the time
horizon, given the constraints it faces22: maxpis =
∑T
t=1 Ptq
s
t s.t. equations 8,
9 and, 10 and round-trip efficiency es. Similarly the generators i ∈ N maximise
the sum of their undiscounted profits, pii =
∑T
t=1 (Pt − ct) qit.
Moving onto the information structure of the game. There is common knowl-
edge that all players know with certainty the T inverse demand intercepts,
A = {ao, . . . , aT }, gradient, b (assumed constant across time), and marginal
costs the generators face, C. Furthermore, all players are aware of the existence
of each other.
In an open-loop model for the generators they only take into account which
time period they are in. For example, all players are aware of all state specific
information such as costs and demand functions. They cannot, however, calcu-
late other players previous strategies by say backing it out of the inverse demand
function. Each strategy is dependent only on information in the current period
t.
In an open-loop model the generators solve the following first-order-condition
in each period t:
δpii
δqit
= 0 (12)
In Cournot competition each player prefers their competitors’ output to be
low and so if δqst+j/δqit is positive at the open-loop equilibrium qi∗t i.e. less
generation today causes the store to produce less tomorrow, say because of a
now reduced inter-temporal spread, then the generator’s strategic incentive is
to, at least locally, to decrease qit (Fudenberg & Tirole, [1991]).
The equilibrium of the game is where both the generators’ and store’s strate-
gies are mutual best-responses. The Nash equilibrium is where the first-order-
22See subsection 8.1 for detail.
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condition in equation 12 is satisfied for all N generators in all time periods given
a storage strategy profile, which is the argmax to the store’s problem in equation
6 (given constraints 8-10), and the generator’s strategy profile. Formally:
qi = arg max
(
pii
) ∀i ∈ N
where
pii
(
qi∗, q−i∗
) ≥ pii (q˜i, q−i∗) ∀i, q˜i ∈ Si
where Si is the set of other possible strategies q˜.
It is important to note that the equilibrium is symmetric for all N generators
since they face common demand conditions and marginal costs.
In summary, we propose a theoretical equilibrium concept for a large energy
storage unit and the conventional generators in the market.
8.3 Equilibrium
In this section we propose a method for finding the solution to both the open-
and closed-loop models described above. However, we are only able to estimate
one of these equilibria, the open-loop model. It was not possible to estimate
a closed-loop equilibrium since we could not estimate a close enough approx-
imation to a relatively complex derivative needed to estimate the closed-loop
equilibrium. Subsection 9.2 elaborates in more detail.
In order to find the Nash equilibrium in both the open- and closed-loop
models we are going to use a relaxation algorithm to iterate towards the Nash
equilibrium. We do not posses the store’s best-response function we cannot sim-
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ply solve the first-order conditions explicitly. Formally, from an initial estimate
of the Nash equilibrium, q0, where q0 denotes the vector of initial estimates of
the Nash equilibrium for each time period, the relaxation algorithm is:
qs+1 = (1− α)qs + αZ (qs)
where 0 < α ≤ 1 is some weighting factor, and s = {0, 1, 2, . . .} is the step
or iteration Z (qs) is the proposed improvement point for the vector of time
periods.
The candidate strategy at step s+1 is a weighted average of an improvement
point Z (qs) and the current point qs(Berridge & Krawczyk, [1998]). In step
0 we start with our initial estimate of the Nash equilibrium q0 which in our
case is the Cournot Nash equilibrium for N generators without a store, which is
symmetric given the setup. Hence the initial estimate of the Nash equilibrium
involves the store buying and selling nothing. We then turn to the store who
now reacts to the net demand curves implied by the initial estimate. This is the
store’s improvement point Z (qs). We then construct qs+1 for the store.
Now we must construct an improvement point, Z (qs), for the generators.
Their original, initial strategy in now not optimal. The improvement point is
therefore constructed by solving equation ?? for the N generators in the market.
We iterate between the generators and the store. It is worth noting we can deal
with the generators simultaneously since their strategies will be symmetric in
equilibrium.
A weighting factor, α is used in order to speed up the conversion to an
equilibrium. If α is set too high then what tends to happen is that strategies
change too much each iteration and so conversion is slow. It is important to
note that the choice of α does not affect the equilibrium we reach, only the
speed of conversion. We are not concerned with the speed of conversion and so
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we select an α equal to 1 for simplicity although more optimal alphas could be
chosen to speed up conversion.
Before we estimate this model it is worth asking whether an equilibrium ex-
ists to this game and if so, is it unique? Berridge & Krawczyk, (1998) show that
there exists a unique Nash equilibrium to which the relaxation algorithm con-
verges if: the strategy space is a convex compact subset of RN+1; the optimum
response function Z (q) is single valued and continuous on q; the Nikaido-Isoda
function is a weakly convex-concave function23. We do not use the Nikaido-Isoda
function in the termination condition, however we do evaluate it upon termina-
tion to prove the suggested solution is a unique Nash equilibrium. Subsection
9.2 explains the empirical methodology in greater detail.
9 Empirical Methodology
The empirical strategy is two fold. First we present a large scale storage al-
gorithm for a store with market power, and second we present the equilibrium
computation strategy.
If we are to maximise profits of a large store we must first construct an
arbitrage maximisation program where the store takes into consideration the
effect their input/output decisions have on the market price. This is in contrast
to other storage maximisation procedures such as Connolly et al. (2011) which
take the market price as given. The storage firm instead faces a demand function
at each discrete point in time and maximises profit subject to these24. We are
23The Nikaido-Isoda function is defined as Ψ (x,y) =
∑n
i=1 [Φi (yi|x)− Φi (x)] where each
summand is the improvement in payoff a player will receive by unilaterally changing their
strategy from xi to yi while other players continue to play x. The function is everywhere
non-positive when x is a Nash equilibrium.
24The net demand functions are predetermined, however the resulting market prices and
demands are a function of the equilibrium choices of all the players in the game.
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also examining how generators may compete against this large store. There are
many information structures we could assume. For example, we could assume
generators are unaware of the storage firm: they choose strategies so as to
maximise profits, and the storage firm moves afterwards in a Stackelberg game.
An equilibrium would therefore involve estimating a Cournot equilibrium for
the conventional generators and then maximsing the store over the remaining
net demand functions.
Another possibility would be to assume the generators are aware of the store
and move simultaneously but seek to maximise their profit at each discrete point
in time rather than overall. Generators would not consider how their actions
today may affect profit tomorrow, i.e. an open-loop model where we assume
generators do not observe the previous actions of the store. However, they are
aware of the store and so we would still need to reach a simultaneous Nash
equilibrium where the generators choose optimally at each discrete time period
subject to the expected actions (which are correct in equilibrium) of the store.
The section will proceed as follows: subsection 9.1 will describe the maximi-
sation procedure for a large storage firm with market power, and subsection 9.2
will describe the estimation procedure for the two equilibria described above.
9.1 Large Scale Storage Algorithm
In order to construct arbitrage strategies for a large scale store with market
power we propose a flexible arbitrage maximisation strategy which is capable of
maximising over discrete demand functions rather than predetermined market
prices, whilst still being subject to the usual constraints on a store such as
power, storage capacity, round-trip efficiency, and ramping constraints25. In
25In the estimation of the equilibrium we shall set the ramping constraint equal to the power
constraint for simplicity of estimation. This would be more indicative of operating many small
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order to maximise storage returns we use constrained optimisation26. This is
computationally intensive, however it allows us to be able to specify the market
price as a function of storage strategy, and so the effect the storage firm has on
market price is internalised. Arbitrage maximisation strategies such as Connolly
et al. (2011) would have been faster, and able to optimise over a longer time
series, but are not as flexible as the above approach.
We use symbolic math to enter the components of our objective function and
perform substitutions inside MATLAB in order to create an objective function
which is only a function of the strategy of the store. This new objective func-
tion is then maximised with respect to the constraints mentioned above using
nonlinear programming. Due to the computationally intensive nature of the
maximisation algorithm only 100 observations/hours are maximised over at a
time.
9.2 Equilibrium Computation
In order to calculate the equilibrium to the problem (open-loop) we propose the
following algorithm. Due to the nature of the store’s optimisation program we
are going to iterate between optimising the generators, and the store in order
to find the simultaneous Nash equilibrium. In the literature this is known as a
relaxation algorithm. The algorithm will stop when the sum of absolute changes
to the generator’s strategy are below an arbitrarily small cutoff point i.e. when
we have reached a fixed point. We cannot solve the problem purely by solving a
system of first-order conditions since the storage algorithm takes the generator’s
actions as given when it maximises it’s own profits. We must therefore iterate
stores rather than one large store.
26Specifically we are going to use fmincon, a constrained nonlinear optimisation tool in
MATLAB.
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between the two types of player.
We first of all need some starting point to begin our iterative solution proce-
dure. We therefore start with a 6 generator Cournot equilibrium assuming the
store is not operating. Six firms are chosen so as to mimic current concentration
ratios in the electricity market27. This provides us with our initial estimate of
the equilibrium, and gives us net demand functions over which the store can
optimise (using the algorithm described above). We run the storage algorithm
to compute optimal strategies for the store given the generator’s actions. We
then return to the generator’s problem since we have the store’s strategy. The
generators’ initial estimate is now non-optimal as a result, and the generators
need to re-optimise.
We now have the store’s response to the Cournot equilibrium and so we now
turn back to the generators to see how they would change their strategies in
response to the store. We then iterate between the two until we reach a mutual
best-response.28.
The generators react to the store’s strategy but do not consider how the store
may change its actions in future periods if the generator changes its strategy
today. We therefore take the first-order conditions for the generators in equation
(12) and solve them simultaneously for the 6 generators at each point in time,
given the store’s strategy. We then return to the store to see if they would behave
differently to the generator’s new strategy and as such we iterate between the
two until the change in the generators strategies is sufficiently small29.
27See Chapter 1 for details.
28The condition we choose is that the sum of absolute changes in a generator’s strategy is
less than 1 MW.
29 Figure 38 in the appendix shows a schematic for how the algorithm operates.
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10 Data
This section describes the inputs to the model. We take a subset of 100 hours
from the net demand data collected in chapter 1. For a fuller description of how
it was collected and modified see section 3 in chapter 1.
What is needed for the model is a series of demand functions for the store and
generators to maximise over, and therefore we need a series of inverse demand
function intercepts, and the slope of the inverse demand function at each point in
time30. We are therefore going to back out the intercepts to the inverse demand
functions from a supply function equilibrium (SFE) for a 2050 GB electricity
market scenario. The SFE provides us with price, quantity pairs where we
can then calculate the inverse demand intercept for a given slope of the demand
function. These provide the store and generators with inverse demand functions
at each point in time for them to maximise over.
In order to calculate a supply function equilibrium for a 2050 scenario we
must have a belief over future demand profiles. We therefore take aggregate
GB electricity demand data at the half-hourly level between the 1st of January
2011 and the first of January 2013 and scale this up to 2050 levels in line with
the central predictions of Ault [2008]. This equates to 1.1% compound growth
per year. However, we do not alter the profile of demand. Predicting aggregate
consumer demand profiles (both daily and seasonally) is beyond the remit of this
paper. Furthermore an assumption on the shape of daily or seasonal demand
would drive prices and associated storage operations and revenues too much for
comfort. While potentially unrealistic all that is important to an arbitrager is
the variance and timing of demand. If these remain roughly the same then our
results are still valid.
30We assume the slope of the demand function is constant, however it would be a trivial
extension to make the slope vary over time.
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We do, however, want to take into account potential future net demand
volatility generated by the increased penetration of renewables. By 2050 40% of
the UK’s electricity needs are set to be supplied by renewables (DECC, 2011).
We therefore need some belief over half hourly hourly renewable energy produc-
tion. We therefore take national grid metered wind turbine generation 31 for
the the same time period. Wind turbine generation is then scaled up to 2050
installed capacity levels. Wind turbine generation is then netted from demand.
This provides us with the net demand profile to be met by generators.
In estimating the supply function equilibrium we must have a belief on the
composition of electricity generation in 2050 and so the marginal cost of gen-
eration. We take DECCs MARKAL 3.26 analogous scenario for 2050 which
includes a scenario for the future composition of generation. The corresponding
marginal costs are taken from National Grid (2012) which include CO2costs
priced at 2050 carbon prices. These are used both in the supply function equi-
librium and the open-loop equilibrium estimated in this chapter.
Finally, the slope of the demand function, i.e. the partial derivative of the
demand curve with respect to price, is taken as −123.92. This is equal to the
figure used by Green & Vasilakos (2011) scaled up to reflect growth in demand.
We then use this data to calculate an equilibrium supply function described
and presented in chapter 1. We then pass the net demand data through this
supply function to get our price, quantity pairs. Inverse demand intercepts are
then calculated for the given slope of the demand function. See figure 5 for the
time series of inverse demand intercepts.
The round-trip efficiency of the storage firm was set at 70%. We then set
the flow constraint, and storage level constraint at very high levels which were
not binding in equilibrium. Effectively the equilibrium presented below is an
unconstrained equilibrium We did this because we wanted the store’s operation
31Data on other types of renewable generation were not available for the whole period.
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to be limited by the market and how much they can buy and sell to maximise
profits, rather than an arbitrary flow constraint or storage constraint. If we
were using a price taking arbitrage model then in the face of unconstrained
flow and storage constraints the store would choose to store as much as they
could (an infinite amount) when prices were low and then discharge it all when
the price increased, given the spread in prices was greater than the round-trip
efficiency. This completes the inputs necessary for us to calculate the open-loop
equilibrium.
Figure 5: Inverse Demand Intercepts
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11 Results
We estimate the open-loop equilibrium between conventional generation firms
and a large store. Generators are only able to observe the time period in ques-
tion, and so any state specific variables.
The results section proceeds as follows. Subsection 11.1 describes the open-
loop equilibrium. Subsection 11.2 then provides details of the convergence in
strategies.
11.1 Open-loop Equilibrium
Figure 6: Open-loop Nash Equilibrium Demand and Prices
We estimate the open-loop equilibrium for the 100 hours of inverse net de-
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Figure 7: Open-loop Conventional Generation and Storage Strategy
mand functions described above. The resulting market clearing demand and
prices are shown in figure 6 and the familiar diurnal profile of demand over the
four days of data can be clearly seen. The average price across the 100 hour
sample was £94.5/MWh32, and the average demand/supply was roughly 32
GW. While this may seem a little high, the demand fundamentals were taken
from mid-winter and so prices and quantities should be relatively high. Fur-
thermore, we were using Cournot competition and this tends to overestimate
prices33. Figure 7 shows the output decisions for both the conventional gener-
ators and the store, and figure 8 shows storage flow and storage level over the
100 hours. We can see the store is charging (negative storage output) when
price and demand is low, and then discharging when the price increases. Like
the small store results in chapter 1, the store cycles roughly once a day. Over
32Valued in 2012 pounds.
33See Willems, Rumiantseva, and Weigt [2009].
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Figure 8: Open-loop Storage Strategy and Storage Level
the sample period of 100 hours the store was able to earn just £62,844. Over a
year that could equate to £5.5m. This is very low given the size of the storage
operations observed. One limiting factor of course is that the store only cycles
once per day and spends several hours per day idle. These results are, however,
for a relatively low round-trip efficiency of 70%. The store could expect to earn
much more if round-trip efficiency were raised, as suggested in chapter 1.
The store’s flow and storage level constraints were set so that the storage
firm was unconstrained in equilibrium34, however we can see that storage never
discharges more than 1 GW per hour and never charges more than 0.8 GW per
hour. Furthermore, the storage level never goes above 4 GWh. Whilst these
are very large quantities it shows that there is natural limit to how large energy
storage can be and maximise arbitraging profit.
34See section 10 for details.
58
In this analysis we have been assuming that the store is operated by one firm
and so can be thought of as a quasi-monopolist in arbitrage. Of course they
are not monopolists in the market overall since there are 6 other conventional
generators also producing the same homogeneous good. However, had we split
the store up in to several competing firms we may have found that we got
slightly more demand shifting (charging and discharging), as you would expect
in Cournot competition. Of course the limiting factor here on how much demand
shifting is possible is the round-trip efficiency of the stores.
In assuming an extremely large energy store who is only bounded by the
market we are ignoring the possibility of a market derived size of energy storage.
We mention above that the storage operations observed here give an indication
as to the maximum size of a store. However, there are a number of reasons to
think that this may be an upper bound on the size of energy storage. We do not
include the payment of any taxes for the store buying/selling electricity. This
would result in the store effectively having an lower round-trip efficiency than
it technically does. Furthermore, we have not included any operational costs
which would again be equivalent to lowering the round-trip efficiency. Finally, we
have not considered any capital costs or required return on investment for energy
storage. It is therefore quite likely that the store would be smaller than implied
by the storage operations. Since the store is effectively pushing the spreads
together by increasing demand off-peak and lowering it on-peak it is likely that
the larger amounts of demand shifting would not be generating enough profit
to cover capital costs. Indeed the relatively small arbitrage revenues we observe
here are suggestive of energy storage being better off taking advantage of low
hanging fruit at smaller quantities and keeping capital costs to a minimum.
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Figure 9: Open-loop Generation Strategy Convergence
11.2 Convergence
Figures 9 and 10 show the strategy convergence for conventional generators,
and the energy store respectively. The Y axis depicts the change in strategy
between iterations, the X axis shows the iteration number, and the Z axis shows
the time period (1-100). For both types of players we can see that most of the
convergence occurs in the first few iterations. Convergence is only as protracted
as it is here because we chose a very low strategy change value for the definition
of a fixed point.
The initial generator strategy is for them to produce the Cournot equilibrium
for 6 symmetric firms. In the solution strategy the store then responds to the
6 firm Cournot outcome. In response to the store’s strategy the conventional
generators then reduce their output in periods of peak demand and increase
their output in times of low demand. This reflects the fact that the store
is increasing demand in low demand periods by charging up the store and is
lowering net demand at peak times by supplying to the market and so giving
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Figure 10: Open-loop Storage Strategy Convergence
generators less incentive to produce during peak demand and more incentive to
produce off-peak.
The energy store converges by slowly increasing the amount they are charg-
ing and discharging as the conventional generators produce less and less at peak
times. Here the negative numbers on the energy storage convergence graph
show that store is increasing their demand/charging. Positive means the store
is increasing its discharging/supply. These graphs give us an idea of how much
we may underestimate a large store’s output if we were not to compute the
Nash equilibrium but rather have the energy store move second in response to
a Cournot equilibrium.
12 Closed-loop Extension
In this section we propose a closed-loop extension to the open-loop model out-
lined above. Much of the theory and practical estimation remain the same, the
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the small addition of closed-loop strategic considerations where applicable.
12.1 Closed-loop Equilibrium
The theoretical model behind a closed-loop equilibrium is much the same as for
an open-loop equilibrium, as described above. This only affect the generators
since we have already established that the store, although it is forward looking,
does not consider how its actions today may affect the play of the generators in
the future. The store is always in an open-loop model.
We make the distinction between open- and closed-loop equilibrium because
a large scale energy store can make the problem a dynamic one where the gen-
erators actions in time period t can affect the play of the store in future periods.
The closed-loop equilibrium addresses this dynamic aspect to large scale energy
storage whereas open-loop assumes it away by limiting the amount of informa-
tion available to the generators, meaning they would not make strategic decisions
in period t in order to influence play in the future. Due to limitations on the
ability to maximise an arbitragers profits we limit the store to the open-loop
model, as described above. The store is still necessarily forward looking since
they are maximising arbitrage revenues over time, however they do not consider
how their actions today may affect the play of competitors in the future.
A closed loop-equilibrium follows what is described in subsection 8.2. In a
closed-loop model all past play is common knowledge. Generators now have
the information to act on the strategic incentive to decide current play so as to
influence the future play of their opponents. Generators i ∈ N therefore seek
to maximise profits given these strategic considerations and will therefore solve
the following first-order-condition in each period t:
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δpii
δqit
+
T∑
j=1
δpii
qst+j
δqst+j
δqit
= 0∀i ∈ N (13)
For a given period t the generators recognise that subsequent period actions
depend upon their actions in period t through the response of the other players
(here the store). As such the generators now have an extra term in their first-
order-condition, which encapsulates their strategic incentive to alter actions
today so as to influence competitors play tomorrow.
In a closed-loop equilibrium, the T th periods actions, after actions in the set
of periods T = {1, . . . , T − 1} have been realised, must be a Nash equilibrium
of this stage game (Fudenberg & Tirole, [1991]). As such the players are only
forward looking in their assessment of how changes in strategy today affect play
tomorrow. Threats of future play are not something considered in a closed-loop
model.
For the closed-loop model the Nash equilibrium is where the first-order-
condition in equation 13 is satisfied for all N generators, in all time periods,
given a storage strategy profile, which is the argmax to the store’s problem in
equation 6 given constraints 8-10, and the generator’s strategy profile.
12.2 Equilibrium Computation: Closed-loop
In order to estimate a closed-loop equilibrium we follow much the same process
as for the open-loop case outlined above. Here the generators seek to take into
consideration how their generation decisions today influence storage strategies
in the future, and so the profits of the generators in those future periods. We
can think of the generators as now maximising total profits, rather than profits
at each point in time. Players move simultaneously and so we estimate a closed-
loop simultaneous Nash equilibrium between the generators and the store.
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In a closed-loop equilibrium the generators are considering not only how
profit at time t is affected by output in time t but also how it is affected by
strategies in periods t − j i.e. how profit in time t is impacted by the store’s
choices in time t, which are a function of the generator i’s strategies in earlier pe-
riods qit−j . This means we have an extra component of the first-order condition
to consider, as specified in equation 13. We can solve for δpiit/δqst analytically
and so this does not present a problem. However, given the nature of the store’s
maximisation procedure we cannot take the derivative δqst+j/δqt explicitly from
the store’s best response function, and must instead take an approximation. In
order to do this we would generate alternative generator strategies by taking the
generator’s previous strategy and making a small change in each time period.
For a T period problem we therefore have T alternative generator strategies.
The storage algorithm would then be run for each of the alternative generator
strategies, and we would approximate the partial derivative in 13 by taking
∆qst+j/∆qt. We then construct the first-order conditions in 13 and solve them
simultaneously as in the open-loop case. We then return to the store and see
how it would respond to this new generator strategy. We would then proceed to
iterate between the generators and the store until the change in the generators’
strategies is sufficiently small, and a mutual best response is reached35.
When we tried to compute the closed-loop equilibrium we were able to reach
a fixed point. However, on closer inspection of the results the approximation
of the partial derivative in 13 was not good enough, which resulted in some
unusual activity from the generator. For example, they over produced at times
of low demand and under produced in times of peak demand. This runs contrary
to our intuition outlined above, and furthermore the generators were found to
35 Figure 38 in the appendix shows a schematic for how the algorithm operates for both
the open- and closed-loop models.
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make less profit in the closed-loop case than the open-loop. This is unusual since
we are giving the generators more information in the closed-loop case. Future
research may aim to better approximate the partial derivative in question, or
possibly explicitly solve for it.
13 Conclusion
In this chapter we have proposed a new method for maximising a large arbi-
traging energy store with market power. We have also proposed a methodology
for calculating the Nash equilibrium between a large energy store with market
power, and conventional generators. We have done this for two different infor-
mation structures: open-loop models, and closed-loop models and have been
able to compute the simultaneous Nash equilibrium for the open-loop informa-
tion model. Previous analysis of large scale energy storage, such as Grünewald
et al. (2011), has not been market focused, or tried to address the market
power a large scale store would have. We do so here by using a flexible maximi-
sation program for the store, and a relaxation algorithm to converge towards
a simultaneous Nash equilibrium. This is an important development of the re-
search around energy storage. By making an open-loop information assumption
it gives us the tractability to be able to estimate an equilibrium with market
power. Furthermore, uncertainty in the energy market may make it infeasible
for generators to make the kind of higher order, strategic, considerations we
propose in the closed-loop equilibrium. Therefore, the open-loop equilibrium
may indeed be a better approximation of reality.
Our calculation of large scale energy storage strategies show us that, for
the time horizon studied, the energy store never discharged more than 1 GW
per hour, never charged more than 0.8 GW per hour, and the storage level
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never exceeded 4 GWh. This provides an indication of the natural limit to
the size on an energy storage unit. Whilst we estimated storage revenues for
a relatively low round-trip efficiency of 70%, the revenues earned by the store
are not encouraging. Over the sample period the store was able to earn just
£62,844. For various reasons, such as capital costs, it is likely that energy
storage would be even smaller than implied by the operation of the store here.
If large scale energy storage were to provide positive externalities not valued in
the wholesale electricity market we estimate here, then either a subsidy or an
explicit pricing of that externality may be needed for large scale energy storage
to become viable.
Further research may try to estimate more precisely the partial derivative in
equation ??, which proved a stumbling block in estimating a closed-loop equi-
librium. Given the computational difficulty in finding the equilibria described
above, we only demonstrate results for a small sample of 100 hours, for a given
round-trip efficiency, and unconstrained storage level and flow constraints. Fur-
ther research may therefore try to estimate storage arbitrage earnings for various
different specifications of the store.
Key stakeholders who may be interested in the research documented in Chap-
ter 2 are academics trying to incorporate large amounts of energy storage into
a model of the energy market, potential developers of energy storage, and pol-
icymaker, including DECC and Ofgem. In this chapter we have provided a
method for estimating an equilibrium in an energy market characterised by
Cournot competition with a large amount of storage. Previous research ne-
glected the impact storage firms can have on the market price, and resulting
strategies of conventional generators. Given that energy storage is projected to
reach relatively high penetrations academics and policymakers alike would ben-
efit from analysing energy storage in a non-cooperative game theoretic setting
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36. Furthermore, we propose a method for extending the analysis to include
a close-loop equilibrium where firms can strategically set quantities to affect
storage strategies in future periods, which would present a step forward in the
analysis of large scale storage.
36See National Grid (2016) for an example of future energy scenarios with a large volume
of storage capacity.
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Part III
Residential Electricity Time-of-Use
Tariffs: A Welfare Analysis
14 Introduction
The increased penetration of variable, non-dispatchable renewable electricity
generation poses greater stress on the system operator to balance supply and
demand potentially leading to higher prices for consumers. In response to this
increased volatility commentators have recommended several courses of action
including energy storage, super-grids, and demand response. Currently, resi-
dential electricity tariffs provide little incentive for consumers to smooth out
consumption as residential electricity tariff structures pose little resemblance
to the true cost of providing power. In the UK domestic consumers generally
face a standing charge and either a single (e.g. flat-rate) or differential tariff
(e.g. economy 7), which is either fixed or variable. Some economists argue that
time-of-use tariffs would raise efficiency and lower the cost of meeting electricity
demand by aligning the marginal cost consumers face with the marginal cost of
generation (Kahn, 1979 and Joskow & Wolfram, 2012).
Figure 11 shows the average UK system sell price in 2014 for each settlement
period37, plus/minus one standard deviation38. We can see that the system sell
price can vary substantially during a day, however consumers face very little
price volatility themselves and so are given little incentive to smooth out their
consumption.There are three main reasons why the cost of generation changes
throughout the day. Firstly, generation generally follows a merit order where low
marginal cost, inflexible base-load generation (such as a nuclear power station)
37Settlement periods are at 30 minute intervals throughout the day.
38Data collected from Elexon. See: www.elexonportal.co.uk/article/view/249?cachebust=zhlw7849gb.
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operates largely continuously. This provides enough power to meet base-load
demand. Shape to the daily demand profile is then provided by higher marginal
cost, but more flexible, generation such as gas. Secondly, there are constraints
on the transmission of electricity which may result in either extra line-losses
or less efficient generation being used to service demand. Thirdly, unforeseen
failures of both generation and transmission capacity can change the marginal
cost of generation significantly. However, although the cost of generation can
vary quite substantially throughout a day, consumers electricity tariffs do not
reflect this very well.
Figure 11: System Sell Price: Average per Settlement Period
One solution to this problem is to align the incentives of consumers and
generators by giving consumers prices which reflect the true cost of meeting
their demand. Time-of-use (TOU) electricity pricing and real time pricing39
39In this chapter “TOU” will be used to mean the general class of electricity tariffs where
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has attracted much attention from academics as a potential means to reduce
peak demand and so address the engineering and environmental challenges of
meeting volatile net demand. Jessoe, Rapson, and Smith (2012) demonstrate
evidence as to its effectiveness. They show that households who are switched
on to a TOU tariff reduce their electricity consumption substantially during
peak periods. Using a field experiment Jessoe and Rapson (2014) go on to show
that informed households with TOU pricing not only reduce demand during
peak pricing periods but also after, suggesting evidence of habit formation,
and spillovers. Wolak (2006) also uses a field experiment to attempt to find
evidence of TOU pricings effectiveness. He finds that consumers do respond to
price changes, but only on days where they are given pricing information, and
so shows little evidence of habit formation. There are therefore still questions as
to the exact size and consistency of consumer response to TOU pricing. Jessoe,
Rapson, and Smith (2013) find evidence that consumers can react unusually to
pricing information. Indeed they found consumers reduced their consumption
in the face of lower electricity prices suggesting other factors aside from price
are also important to consumers.
Schofield et al. (2014) investigated the potential value of residential demand
response from a demand side response trial which took place in London during
2013, Low Carbon London (LCL). A subset of the programme were given ex-
ante revenue-neutral dynamic time-of-use prices (dTOU) with prices ranging
from £0.04/kWh to £0.67/kWh. They found consumers were incentivised to
change their electricity consumption in reaction to changes in the tariff. Over
the course of the trial year 95% of households saved money relative to what they
would have spent. They further found that peak demand was reduced by 10%,
with more engaged households showing a reduction of 20%. Indeed, they did find
consumers bay a different rate at different times of use, including real time, conventional TOU,
and dynamic pricing such as critical peak pricing.
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a significant amount of variation in engagement between individual households.
The LCL trial also found that the amount of engagement was unrelated to any
of the socio-economic indicators which were available to them.
Faruqui (2010), documents further evidence on potential gains from dynamic
tariffs. The New York Independent System Operator expected to find similar re-
sults to Schofield et al. (2014) where peak demand was expected to fall between
10-14% on the universal deployment of real time pricing. Furthermore, Faruqui
and George (2005) find in analysing the results of California’s Statewide Pricing
Pilot that consumer response to TOU rates are highly dependent on peak-to-
off-peak price ratio. Ratios of around 2 to 1 find results of roughly 5%. Whereas
5 to 1 and 10 to 1 ratios produced reductions of between 8 and 15% with no
enabling technology i.e. smart meters, and between 25% and 30% when paired
with enabling technology. However, they did find that responsiveness varied
with climate zone, air-conditioning ownership, and other customer characteris-
tics.
The Irish Commission for Energy Regulation conducted a largest, and sta-
tistically robust smart metering behavioural trial to provide information on the
impact of smart metering initiatives on consumers. Involving roughly 5,000
consumers, who were given up to 4 price bands in a day, they found that the
deployment of TOU tariffs in combination with other stimuli, including financial
feedback, resulted in changes in energy consumption. Residential trial partici-
pants reduced energy consumption both overall and at times of peak demand.
Indeed, for consumers with TOU tariffs, and demand side management stimuli,
overall electricity demand was reduced 2.5%, and peak usage by 8.8%. Those
receiving a bi-monthly bill and with access to a smart meter were found to re-
duce peak demand by even more (11.3%). They further found that reductions
were correlated with usage i.e. high usage households reduced consumption the
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most.
In addition, Carroll, Lyons, and Denny (2013) further analyse the Irish
smart meter trial and find evidence that providing information and feedback
acts mainly as a reminder and motivator for those under TOU tariffs. They
find that feedback significantly increases consumers knowledge of their electric-
ity usage, however improvements in knowledge are not correlated with demand
reductions.
Di Cosmo, O’Hara, and Devitt (2015) further analysed the results of the Irish
smart meter trial. They find that while the TOU tariffs reduced peak demand,
the most reliable reductions in demand were achieved by those consumers with
in-house displays and were provided financial feedback through them. Whereas
bi-monthly billing provided the least reduction. They also used information
on consumers educational attainment and showed that those consumers with
higher levels of education used the information associated to the TOU tariffs
slightly better than the average.
Gans, Alberini, and Longo (2012) however, find that the provision of in-
formation produces large declines in electricity consumption. They analyse a
natural experiment in Northern Ireland where standard prepayment meters were
replace with smart meter providing real-time data on consumption. They show
that as a this caused a decline in electricity consumption of between 11-17%.
Although TOU tariffs can be effective, as demonstrated above, not all TOU
tariffs are created equally. Faruqui and George (2002) demonstrates that dy-
namic pricing, where either the size of the price change, or the timing, are set by
system demands, can be much more effective than conventional TOU pricing.
However, they show that net benefits can vary significantly with the charac-
teristics of the customer base, the cost curve applying to the industry, and the
behavioural patterns of the consumers.
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Faruqui and Sergici (2009) survey the experimental evidence on household
response to dynamic electricity pricing. They survey evidence from the, as
of then, 15 most recent experiments with dynamic pricing of electricity. The
document conclusive evidence that households respond to higher prices by low-
ering demand. The magnitude of price response depends on several factors,
including the magnitude of the price increases, whether the household has air-
conditioning, and enabling technology, including smart meters. Across the ex-
periments studied TOU rates tended to induce between a 3-6% drop in peak
demand. Whereas critical-peak pricing tariffs induced drops between 13-20%.
Furthermore, when these are accompanied by enabling technologies critical-peak
pricing induced reductions of between 27-44% in peak household demand. This
is also corroborated by Faruqui, Hledik, and Palmer (2012), who show that load
shifting increases with the size of the price signal but at a decreasing rate,
Despite the questions about TOU tariff efficacy, there are potentially impor-
tant concerns relating to the equability of such a policy (Faruqui, 2010). One
particular concern is that TOU tariffs may be regressive in nature. For example,
low income, low use households may only use electricity when it is needed the
most, and so at times of peak demand and peak price under a TOU tariff. In this
way they may lose out relative to high use consumers. Research by Horowitz
and Lave (2012) discovered this to be the case in Chicago. Alternatively low
income household may have less energy efficient appliances and so may have
higher electricity consumption relative to high income households and so be hit
harder by peak pricing.
Faruqui, Hledik, and Palmer (2012) shows that each design of TOU tariff
can produce different degrees of price volatility and uncertainty for consumers.
Furthermore, there could be a loss of welfare associated with reducing usage
during high price periods, or indeed with the hassle of shifting consumption to
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lower price periods.In this paper we therefore aim to explore what would be the
effects such a tariff structure on consumer bills, and who would win and who
would lose out as a result.
We propose three revenue-neutral tariffs in the spirit of Borenstein (2013)
whereby consumers would on average have the same bill whether they opted for
a TOU tariff or not. The tariffs are designed to reflect the true cost of supplying
electricity to the consumer and so are based upon the average system demand
for each settlement period in 2014. For the reasons mentioned above electricity
prices tend to be higher at times of peak demand as so we use it as a proxy for
the true cost. Section 16 explains in detail how we arrive at each of the tariffs.
We then apply these tariffs to the individual household consumption data
in the HES and arrive at household specific spends over the period they were
observed. We then scale these up to give us a yearly spend under each proposed
tariff. We then compare each household’s proposed spend with how much they
would have spent under a flat-rate tariff. We then perform analysis on the
distribution of winners and losers - specifically looking at how consumers are
affected by average use, and social indicators. We also explore how this changes
when some degree of demand response is incorporated.
15 Data
The remit of this research is to construct three TOU tariffs and analyse the
welfare implications of each. All three are based on average Great Britain (GB)
aggregate system demand and will take the same shape. Therefore when average
GB system demand is low the TOU prices shall also be low. In order to do this
we first need information on the data underlying the three proposed tariffs.
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Great Britain aggregate system demand data at settlement period level is used
from the National Grid40. Figure 12 provides an illustration of the the average
system demand per settlement period.
Residential consumption data is used from the Household Electricity Survey
(2013)41. The HES surveyed households at various different levels from individ-
ual appliance up to overall household demand, and different levels of regularity
from half hour upwards. Overall, 224 households were observed continuously at
the half hourly level. On average each household was monitored for 343 days42
which gives us a representative sample of how households shall be affected across
the year. The relatively small sample size however means that we could not say
anything about demand differences and so bill differences across the year and
so we could not base our tariffs on seasonal variations in demand. However, we
do look at average residential demand at the settlement period level.
The diurnal average demand in figure 13 was then used to construct revenue-
neutral residential electricity tariffs. Subsection 16.2 explains in detail how this
was performed.
In order to perform distributional welfare analysis the HES supplies us with
a rich set of information on the households being surveyed. This includes social
class, household type, the number of rooms in the property, and the number
of electrical appliances in the household among others. Unfortunately the HES
does not provide us with information of the respondents incomes, however we
are able to use the indicators listed above as a proxy for income/wealth and
can build up a picture of who may be affected by TOU tariffs, by how much,
and what the variance in bill change from flat to TOU may be i.e. are some
households severely adversely/positively affected by a change to TOU tariff?
40See National Grid (2015).
41See HES (2013).
42See figure 39 in the appendix for the distribution of household observation length.
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Figure 12: Average GB Electricity Demand (MW)
Finally, the baseline flat rate tariff is given as 20 cents per kWh, taken from
International Domestic Energy Prices (2015) from the Department of Energy
and Climate Change (DECC)43. We retain the use of cents and dollars so as to
make the results easily comparable between countries.
15.1 Household Electricity Survey Consumer Profiles
In this section we provide some summary information on the Household Elec-
tricity Survey and the households they observed. The Household Electricity
Survey was conducted over 2010 and 2011, and was published in 2013. In total
there were 224 households who participated in at least half hourly monitoring.
43See https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/international-domestic-
energy-prices.
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On average each household was observed for 344 days with a minimum of 198
days of observation, and a maximum of 778 days of observation. The standard
deviation of observation length was roughly 85 days44. The median household
lived in a two storey semi-detached house in an urban/suburban environment.
On average there were 5 heated habitable rooms in each property, which was on
average constructed between 1950 and 1966. There were on average 2 people
living in each property where roughly a third were retired, and third worked
full time in a household with children. The median household (37%) described
themselves as lower middle class while 71% described themselves as upper, mid-
dle, or lower middle class. Households on average owned 40 electrical appliances
with a range between 13 and 85 appliances.
16 Proposed Dynamic Pricing
We shall first outline the theoretical foundation for the proposed TOU tariff.
The tariffs do not, however vary with historical real time conditions in the elec-
tricity market. in subsection 16.1. Subsection 16.2 then proceeds to outline
how the tariffs are constructed. Where we refer to TOU tariffs, in reality the
tariff arrived at in this analysis is perhaps more closely akin to real time pric-
ing. The tariffs do not, however vary with historical real time conditions in
the electricity market. We shall examine 3 tariffs with increasing price disper-
sion, however all are revenue-neutral relative to a flat-rate tariff of 20 cents
per kWh for the sample of households from the HES. The underlying shape
of the tariff is based upon average GB demand by settlement period in order
44 For a histogram of household observation length see figure 39 in the appendix.
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to approximate the real cost of supplying electricity to residential consumers.
Generation is broadly scheduled in merit order meaning that lower marginal
cost generation is scheduled first with higher marginal cost generation meeting
peak demand. Furthermore, local shortages and so higher wholesale prices are
more likely in times of peak demand. We therefore use the diurnal pattern of
demand as the basis of our revenue-neutral tariffs. We price our tariffs at the
settlement period/half hourly level in order to give us the highest possible de-
gree of granulation. It would be interesting to examine the distributional effects
of seasonal variations in residential electricity price, however we do not observe
enough households in order to make any clear judgments on how seasonal tar-
iffs would affect consumers. Furthermore, heating is mainly provided by gas in
Great Britain, and given the limited need for space cooling in summer there is
not as large a variation in generation between summer and winter as in other
countries. Residential consumers could try to lower their consumption in peak
times, such as in the evening in winter, however they can not generally shift
their electricity consumption from winter to summer in the face of TOU tariffs,
and so a seasonal tariff would lack that benefits of efficient TOU pricing. See
figure 13 for a plot of daily average demand across 2014.
16.1 Theoretical Tariff Structure
The TOU tariffs under analysis here are identical in design to those studied in
Borenstein (2013) and have the same underlying theory behind them. Although
the precise structure of the proposed TOU and flat-rate tariffs does not affect the
welfare analysis per se (we could for example arbitrarily impose the TOU tariff
on all consumers), it is useful to construct a setting under which we can visualise
these tariffs operating. The tariffs under analysis are designed to be revenue-
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Figure 13: Daily Average GB Electricity Demand, 2014
neutral, whilst also reflecting the true cost of providing electricity45. Borenstein
(2013) outlines four fundamental goals for his proposed residential tariff design,
inspired by Bonbright et al. in Principles of public utility regulation, (1989).
These are that the tariff should: cover the cost of providing power; provide
efficient pricing; minimise bill volatility; and there should be no undue cross-
subsidisation among consumers.
Firstly we assume there are two tariffs available to consumers: a flat rate
tariff; and a TOU tariff where consumers are charged according to when they
consume. Furthermore, the TOU tariff is optional - consumers are by default
enrolled on the flat-rate tariff and can opt-in to TOU pricing. The tariffs are
also designed to be equitable and revenue-neutral, meaning that each group of
consumers (TOU and flat-rate) should cover the cost of providing power to each
group (i.e. there should be no cross-subsidisation), and the combined revenues
from the two tariffs should not exceed what would have been collected if TOU
45For a fuller discussion of equitable opt-in dynamic tariffs see Borenstein (2013).
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tariffs were not available (assuming consumption behaviour is unchanged by the
introduction of TOU tariffs).
We now postulate how the adoption of the TOU tariff may develop. As
a starting point let us assume that the initial TOU tariff would be revenue
neutral if the average consumer with an average consumption profile were to
switch to the tariff. Consumers could then potentially be informed of their
potential savings through the installation of smart meters and shadow billing.
If we assume consumers are perfectly informed of their potential savings, and
switching costs are not prohibitive then those consumers who demanded power
disproportionately in low cost periods would switch to TOU pricing. Indeed all
consumers up to the marginal consumer would switch.
Now the consumer profile of the two tariffs is very different. Those on the
TOU tariff generally consume in low cost periods and so on average the cost
of supply electricity to these consumers is lower than those who remain on the
flat rate tariff. If the two tariffs are to remain equitable then the price of these
two tariffs must change to reflect the changed demography. The flat-rate tariff
therefore increases and the TOU decreases relative to the initial proposal. The
marginal consumer is therefore no longer marginal and would switch to the TOU
tariff. Consumers would keep on switching as the flat-rate tariff became more
and more expensive. Indeed this would continue until all consumers, barring
the most expensive consumer, who would be indifferent between switching and
not switching, are on the TOU tariff. While this may at the outset seem unfair
to the consumers who demand power when it is at it’s most expensive (they are
being charged more when they potentially need the power most) all that has
happened is that the cross-subsidisation of consumers, which is the case under
flat-rate tariffs, has been removed. The price faced by the end consumer is now
reflecting marginal cost and consumers are provided with an efficient incentive
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for the timing of their consumption.
If consumers responded to these more efficient price signals by moving con-
sumption from high cost to low cost periods then the process outlined above
would only be exacerbated (and in turn beneficial to both generators and con-
sumers alike). However, in reality, the unraveling process outlined above would
probably not continue to its conclusion. As I demonstrate later (and was found
for California in Borenstein [2013]), the changes in consumers bills are rela-
tively small, and therefore would perhaps not induce all customers to switch to
a TOU tariff. If consumers go on to lower or move their consumption to lower
cost periods then the potential savings may be much higher.
However, Borenstein and Holland (2005) find that this kind of response tends
to lower, rather than increase, the price for customers who remain on the default
flat-rate. This is because if those on TOU tariffs redistribute their demand
to lower their bills, then as the share consumers on TOU tariffs increases, the
wholesale price at peak times drops. Of course the off-peak price will increase as
demand is shifted off-peak, however, if peak time prices drop sufficiently relative
to the increase in off-peak prices then those on flat-rate tariffs can become better
off. Borenstein and Holland (2005) also show that those customers who are
originally on TOU tariffs can become worse off as the share consumers on TOU
tariffs increases.
There could however be social welfare reasons for retaining flat-rate tariffs.
For example if flat-rates were progressive, or TOU tariffs were regressive in
nature then the cross-subsidisation of consumers could be justified for social
reasons. Indeed this is a potentially significant source of opposition to TOU
tariffs. This analysis therefore seeks to explore these possibilities in section 17.
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16.2 Tariff Construction
Each tariff is based upon the diurnal profile of average GB electricity demand,
reflecting the true cost of generating and distributing electricity. In order to
generate different spreads in residential electricity price for each tariff we take
the basic diurnal shape of electricity demand and stretch out the series to create
a different spread for each tariff. This allows us to have half hour prices which
are up to ten times as much as the minimum price.
We first take the consumption data supplied by the HES and apply a flat-rate
charge of 20 cents per kWh to it. This provides us with total and average spends
for each household, and a total spend across the whole sample of households.
The proposed tariffs will then be revenue-neutral against the total spend on a
flat-rate tariff. We then take an average of 2014 GB electricity demand for each
half hour/settlement period. This provides us with the diurnal profile of average
GB demand to base our tariffs on. See figure 12 the average GB demand by
settlement period.
The settlement period averages are then transformed into proportions of
the maximum value of average GB electricity demand. For example for the
settlement period with the highest average GB demand the proportion would
be 1. If the minimum was half of the maximum then that settlement period
would take on the value 0.5. This provides the basis of the proposed tariffs.
The half hour with the highest GB electricity demand will have the highest
residential electricity price. The minimum demand period will have the lowest
residential electricity price. If we used the proportion of maximum average
demand then the in the example above the minimum price would be half that
of the maximum. This proportion based profile would provide us with a fairly
wide spread of prices already, however to increase the spread between electricity
prices we take the cube, and the fifth power of these proportions to give us more
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variation in electricity price.
We then transform these daily proportion profiles into prices by calculating
the scalar we can multiply the series by in order for the proposed price profile to
be revenue-neutral. This involves first multiplying each tariff proportion by the
total kWh consumed by the sample households in each settlement period. We
then calculate the scalar the sum of these consumption weighted proportions
can be multiplied by in order for the proposed tariff and the original flat-rate
tariff of 20 cents per kWh to be revenue-neutral.
We can see in figure 14 the resulting tariffs based on GB demand. The
flattest profile is based upon each settlement periods average GB demand as
a proportion of the highest average settlement period GB demand. The more
dispersed profiles with a greater spread in prices are based upon the cube, and
fifth powers of the proportion as described above. We can see that for the
fifth power tariff schedule (the tariff with the greatest spread) the lowest half
hourly price is roughly a tenth of the highest half hourly price. The different
tariff spreads then allow us to explore how sensitive our distributional welfare
analysis is to how variable the tariff structure is.
It is important to note at this point that the HES does not record what
electricity tariff each household was on. We therefore do not know what marginal
price they were already facing, or indeed whether they were already reacting
to tariff structures like economy 7. While this may bias our analysis there is
reason to not be overly worried. Residential electricity prices are relatively
homogeneous and consumers are not very price responsive since they face either
a flat-rate or simple differential tariff.
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Figure 14: Tariff by Settlement Period
17 Welfare Analysis
In this section we shall explore the distributional effects of the change from a
flat-rate tariff to the TOU tariffs proposed in section 16.2. Concerns about the
distribution of winners and losers have the potential to thwart the implementa-
tion of TOU tariffs if they are seen to be regressive, or risky by imposing large
changes to individual households electricity bills. In order to examine these is-
sues we have constructed three tariffs to based upon average electricity demand
each settlement period so as to reflect the higher costs associated with meeting
demand at peak times. Each tariff is revenue-neutral relative to a flat-rate of 20
cents per kWh, however we have accentuated tariffs 2 and 3 to give us greater
spread in the marginal price throughout the day. The three tariffs are depicted
in figure 14.
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In subsection 17.1 we assume no demand in response to the proposed TOU
tariffs. Consumption is assumed to be unchanged and therefore consumers have
a price elasticity of demand of 0. In subsection 17.2 we allow households to
adjust their consumption in response to the new TOU tariffs. In the demand
response analysis we examine two different price elasticities of demand: -0.1,
and -0.3 respectively, as studied in Borenstein (2013). As he notes, it would be
unlikely for the elasticity of demand to be larger than -0.1 in absolute terms
in the short run. However, as demand response technology improved, including
potentially automating residential demand response, a price elasticity of -0.3
would become a better approximation.
17.1 Mandatory Time-of-Use Pricing without Demand Re-
sponse
A good starting point for analysing how mandatory TOU tariffs would affect
consumers is to look at the distribution of annual bill changes from the flat-rate
tariff of 20 cents per kWh to the TOU tariffs proposed in figure 14. Figure 15
provides a summary of the change in the distribution of annual bills.46 We can
see that for the tariff with the least spread in price, TOU tariff 1, there is very
little change to households bills. Most consumers see a very small fall whilst a
small minority of households who use energy disproportionately at peak times
see their bills increase up to 6%. TOU tariff 2 provides a much greater spread in
prices throughout the day, and so we see much larger changes to consumer bills.
The distribution is skewed to the right, having a fat right hand tail meaning
46 Individual histograms can be found in the appendix in figures 40, 41, and 42 for TOU
tariffs 1, 2, and 3 respectively.
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that many households see their bills unchanged or decreased slightly whereas a
significant minority see their bills rise up to 17%. This is repeated for households
facing TOU tariff 3 where we once again observe a positive skew. The right hand
tail is more pronounced with some households seeing their bills increase up to
25%. The median consumer sees their annual bill fall whilst those who consume
disproportionately at peak times see their bills increase. This is reassuring as,
even without demand response and the associated decrease in energy costs, we
predict more than 50% of consumers will see their bill fall.
However, even under TOU tariff 3, the range of bill change is reasonably
small. Tariff has a significant spread of prices, indeed, the peak price is roughly
10 times the lowest price and yet we see bills changing by a relatively small
amount. Only 3 of our 224 households would see their bills change by more
than 20% in absolute terms. Indeed only 11 households would see their bills
rise by 10% or more, and 35 see their bills increase by 5% or more. However,
only 8 households saw their bill decrease by more than 5% with 105 households
seeing their bills drop by under 5%. TOU tariff 3 would therefore on average
redistribute from the few who used electricity disproportionately at times of
peak demand to the many who do not.
These results are similar to those found by Borenstein (2013) who shows a
positive skew to the change in household electricity bills in the face of mandatory
TOU pricing. Borenstein (2013) also find similar proportions of consumers who
would see their bills change by 20% or more. However, it is worth noting
that TOU tariff 3 has a much greater spread in prices than those studied by
Borenstein. This implies that electricity providers in Great Britain would able
to give substantially stronger price signals for a given distributional change in
annual electricity bills than California.
We have shown that even for tariffs with a large spread in residential electric-
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Figure 15: Distributions of annual bill change from flat-rate to TOU tariffs
ity prices there is not a substantial effect on household annual bills. However,
we may still be concerned about where the incidence of the bill changes falls. A
tariff structure which was regressive or affects certain sections of society much
more heavily than others would potentially cause enough concern to prevent
adoption.
It would be interesting to explore the geographical spread of bill changes,
as more northern areas of the country have fewer hours of daylight and so
have more demand for electric lighting, however the HES does not provide any
information on the location of households. The HES does provide information on
household social grade, working status, electricity usage, the number of electrical
appliances, the number of heated habitable rooms in the property, and the
household type such as household with children, retired household, etc. We
provide a breakdown of how these various groups would be effected by the
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proposed TOU tariff 3 in tables 7 and 847.
Table 7: Distribution of average bill change by usage, no. of appliances, and
no. of rooms
Annual usage (kWh) % No. of Appliance % No. of Rooms %
Q<1000 -1.76 Q≤20 0.93 1-2 -3.58
1000<Q<1600 0.57 21≤Q≤40 1.19 3-4 1.75
1600<Q<2200 1.89 41≤Q≤60 0.31 5-6 0.9
2200<Q<2800 1.65 Q≥61 1.15 7-8 1.09
Q>2800 1.44 9-10 -1.75
Table 8: Distribution of bill change by working status, social grade, and house-
hold type
Working Status % Social Grade % Household Type %
Full time 0.2 A 2.74 Single non pensioner -0.62
Part time 1.54 B -0.43 Multiple person 1.81
In education 1.57 C1 0.6 Household with children 0.69
Unemployed 0.13 C2 1.19 Pensioner 0.84
Retired 1.34 D 3.26
E 3.59
Table 7 displays the average percentage change in households annual elec-
tricity bill by annual usage, the number of electrical appliances a household
owns, and the number of heated habitable rooms in the property. One way to
look at these three indicators is to think of them as being proxies for a house-
hold’s wealth, or income. Reassuringly we find that higher levels of usage are
associated with an increase in the average annual bill. Households with higher
electricity use would face an increase in their bills relative to low use households,
and so be contributing more to the upkeep of the system they use more48. How-
ever, there is little pattern to how households bills would change by the number
47We provide this analysis only for TOU tariff 3 because TOU tariffs 1 and 2 are transfor-
mations of tariff 3 and so should convey the same information, except with lower values, given
the reduced spread in prices.
48 The distribution of annual usage can be found in figure 43 in the appendix.
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of appliances or rooms in the property. There is a lot of heterogeneity within ap-
pliance and room number groups and it appears likely that neither are strongly
related to annual bill change. However, the relatively small sample size makes
it hard to say for certain.
Table 8 displays the average percentage change in households annual electric-
ity bill by working status, social grade, and household type respectively. There
does not appear to be any discernible trend with respect to working status or
household type. The effects within each group were again very heterogeneous
and were not strongly related to working status or household type. TOU tariff
3 does appear to be regressive with respect to it’s effect on households in social
grades D and E. However, the standard errors were large, and the effect on
households was very heterogeneous within each group.
Annual bill change appears to be uncorrelated with the variables used, how-
ever the sample size was relatively small and the standard errors were large.
Generally there was a lot of heterogeneity in annual bill change, even within
each category under analysis and as such these gave little inclination as to who
may be affected by the introduction of TOU tariffs. This is reassuring in one
respect since it appears a change to TOU tariff 3 would be neither regressive nor
progressive and simply reward those who consumed less, and at times of spare
capacity. However, the small sample size makes it hard to say with any surety.
Higher levels of annual usage appear to indicate a higher electricity bill, relative
to low users, under TOU pricing, which again is reassuring. Annual usage was
also positively correlated with bill change, with a correlation coefficient of 0.21.
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17.2 Mandatory Time-of-Use Pricing with Demand Re-
sponse
The analysis up until this point has assumed that consumers will not change
their consumption patterns in the face of a switch a TOU tariff, that their
price elasticity of demand is 0. However, with the advent of smart meters it is
entirely feasible that consumers would know exactly what price they face at each
point in time, and even be able to automate some of their consumption to take
advantage of the tariff profile. For example through electric heating, electric
cars, and the operation of large white goods. In this subsection we therefore
incorporate demand response to the analysis given in subsection 17.1.
When we constructed the TOU tariffs we did so under the assumption that
a move from flat-rate to TOU tariff would be revenue-neutral. Here we allow
household consumption to change and so if we are to keep the tariffs revenue-
neutral we must make more stringent assumptions about the generation cost
structure. We must assume that changes in quantity under the TOU tariff
impose marginal costs that are equal to the TOU tariff rate. This would mean
that the change in quantity did not require a tariff change in order to keep
profit levels the same. Alternatively we could assume that the cost savings
from running plant more efficiently (lowering peak production and increasing
off-peak) are equal to the lower revenues collected.
Two price elasticities of demand shall be examined, as in Borenstein (2013).
A short run elasticity of -0.1, and long run elasticity of -0.3, which is perhaps
more reasonable as demand response technologies improve. We explore issues
of demand response for TOU tariff 3 only for brevity since it provides us with
the greatest price signals, and represents the greatest spread of prices likely in
GB residential electricity pricing. Furthermore, tariffs 1 and 2 have the same
shape as tariff 3 and so would provide us with similar results.
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Figure 16: Distribution of annual bill change from flat-rate to tariff 3 with
demand response
In order to explore the effects of demand response we construct alternative
household consumption profiles in response to TOU tariff 3 assuming a constant
elasticity demand function with price elasticities of -0.1, and -0.3 respectively.
Figures 16 and 17 display the distribution of annual bill change from the flat-
rate tariff, and tariff 3 with no demand response to tariff 3 with demand for
each elasticity49.
Figure 16 shows how households would be affected by the introduction of
TOU tariff 3 compared to the flat-rate tariff, under an assumption of demand
response. It is directly comparable to figure 42 in the appendix which shows
the distribution of bill changes from a flat-rate tariff to TOU tariff 3 under an
49 For a distribution of each bill change separately by elasticity see figures 45 through 48.
91
Figure 17: Distribution of annual bill change from tariff 3 with PED = 0 to
tariff 3 with demand response
assumption of no demand response. Figure 17 shows the distribution of annual
bill change from tariff 3 with no demand response to tariff 3 with demand
response - alternatively, how households would be be affected from moving from
an assumption of no demand response to demand response under tariff 3. We
can see, unsurprisingly that under a modest price elasticity of -0.1 consumers
are better off than under no demand response. The average bill is reduced 3.28%
relative to the revenue-neutral level and only 46 of 224 households would see
their bills rise relative to the flat-rate tariff with a maximum increase of 19%
compared to 25% under no demand response.
Under a constant price elasticity of demand of -0.3 we see households become
much better off than under the constant flat-rate tariff. Households would on
average face nearly 10% lower electricity bills. Indeed only 5 households would
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see bill rise after a move to TOU tariff 3, with a maximum increase of 7.5%,
and a maximum decrease of 27%. However, these kind of savings would only
become possible when demand response technology was sophisticated enough
for consumers could react sufficiently to prices. While the exact value of the
price elasticity may be debatable it is important to note that these savings
are only possible with the introduction of TOU tariffs. With flat-rate tariffs
consumers face little incentive to move their consumption from times of high
demand to low. With TOU tariffs and demand response technology consumers
have the incentive and the means to do so. While we estimate how much this
may lower households electricity bills it would also be beneficial for generators,
distributors, and retailers as the costs of supplying electricity would be lower.
As mentioned earlier, we are implicitly assuming that for the TOU tariffs
with demand response to be profit neutral either changes in quantity impose
marginal costs equal to the TOU tariff rate at the time, or that the cost sav-
ings from running plant more efficiently are equivalent to the lower revenues
collected. Under a price elasticity of demand of -0.1 we saw that households
would save on average 3.28% of their current bill and under a demand elasticity
of -0.3 they would save nearly 10% on average. While it is beyond the remit of
this paper to estimate likely technical savings from more efficient consumption
profiles it is perhaps unlikely that cost savings would be as much as 10%, es-
pecially when, under constant elasticity demand response, quantities demanded
are the same before and after TOU tariff introduction. In fact it is feasible that
consumers could increase their consumption in response to a TOU tariff as there
could be an efficiency loss as a result of moving consumption to other parts of
the day, for example heating.
Another way to think about the bill savings households would expect under
TOU tariffs with demand response is how much electricity prices could increase
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and for households to remain on average better off. Electricity provision is highly
capital intensive and generators tend to recover a disproportionate amount of
their costs through high prices at times of peak demand. As consumers moved
consumption away from peak periods, generators would likely see their profits
fall, as has been seen in California with the introduction of distributed photo-
voltaic generation50. Indeed capacity market auctions have tried to address this
to an extent in Great Britain.
Given that costs are unlikely to fall as much as 10% after the introduction of
TOU tariffs it is therefore relatively likely retailers would seek to raise electricity
prices in response to a fall in demand at peak times. However, given the system
would be less costly to operate under more efficient pricing it is reasonable to
assume the average consumer would see their bills stay the same if not decrease.
Importantly, consumers who disproportionately consume at peak times would
no longer be subsidised by those who do not as is the case under flat-rate tariffs.
18 Conclusion
In this chapter we have explored demand side management and TOU tariffs
in particular. A clear threat to the adoption of TOU tariffs is the fear that
there will be winners and losers and that this may run along socioeconomic
lines. Indeed that they may be regressive or provoke an increase in residential
electricity tariffs. We have therefore sought to analyse who would be affected by
a switch to TOU tariffs and by how much using a novel data-set, the Household
Electricity Survey (2013).
We construct revenue-neutral tariffs based upon the diurnal GB electricity
50This has been with increasing block pricing rather than TOU pricing however the principle
remains the same. See Cohen, Kauzmann, and Callaway (2015), and Borenstein (2015) for
further details.
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demand profile to reflect the true cost of supplying electricity. We found that
under revenue-neutral tariff setting with no demand response households are not
exposed to excessive bill increases. The tariff with the greatest spread, TOU
tariff 3, would see only 11 of the 224 households studied have their bills rise by
more than 10% with a maximum increase of roughly 25%. A similar previous
study, Borenstein (2013), found similar likely distributional effects despite this
study having a much larger spread of prices than the previous study. A further
analysis of household characteristics found household bill change to be uncor-
related with a range of socioeconomic indicators implying the tariffs proposed
are not regressive in nature. However, the low sample size makes it hard to say
for certain. We did find that bill increases were positively related to electricity
use (although bill change was fairly heterogeneous within each demand range).
We then sought to analyse how consumers may be affected if they were able
to respond to the changed pricing profile. Using constant elasticity demand
functions with price elasticity of demands of -0.1, and -0.3 to represent the short
term and long term response to TOU pricing we found that consumers could
become much better off. Indeed under a constant elasticity of -0.3 households
could expect 10% lower electricity bills on average. However, it is likely that
retailers would seek to increase TOU prices in response in order to cover fixed
costs of generation and for profits to be retained. The net effect would likely be
beneficial for consumers, however, since the more efficient pricing of residential
electricity would lead to more efficient consumption, generation and distribution,
and generation and distribution costs would likely fall.
Importantly, under TOU tariffs consumers who use power disproportionately
at times of low demand, and so low cost, would no longer be effectively sub-
sidising those who use power disproportionately at time of peak demand, and
so high cost, as they are currently under flat-rate tariffs. Furthermore, as more
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inflexible generation is added to the grid it may become desirable and possibly
necessary for consumers to react to TOU prices in order to reduce the cost of
meeting demand, and reduce the need for spare generation capacity. It is there-
fore reassuring to have evidence suggesting that even TOU tariffs with a very
large spreads would produce relatively little dispersion in households electricity
bills and are unlikely to be regressive.
We have used average demand by settlement period as a proxy for the true
cost of supplying electricity, however with a much larger sample size it would
be interesting to not only explore the effects of seasonal variations in electricity
price, but also real-time pricing. Hogan (2014) points out that if TOU prices
are set in advance then even very good TOU tariffs would miss the majority of
efficiency gains that would result with the use of actual real-time prices. Figure
11, found in the introduction, provides some indication of this by showing that
sell prices have a great deal of volatility to them, especially around times of peak
demand. It would therefore be interesting to explore how bill change volatility
was affected by a move to real-time pricing. However, the fact that we find
electricity bill changes to be relatively small for even very large variations in
price indicates that households should not be particularly adversely affected
from a move to real-time pricing rather than preset TOU tariffs.
Key stakeholders who may be interested in the research documented in Chap-
ter 3 are energy firms and policymakers exploring the potential for demand side
response, including the system operator, DECC, and Ofgem. Furthermore, con-
sumers fearing a loss of welfare on the introduction of demand side response may
be interested in the results. We show that consumers will not be particularly
adversely affected, and the only group who are potentially worse off are the
consumers with high electricity usage. This is encouraging for consumers in
general. However, given the relatively small effects we see on consumers bills,
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there is reason to believe consumers may not respond to these small poten-
tial gains and losses, and the cost of either monitoring software, or indeed the
mental cost of monitoring and reacting to this price information may be too
prohibitive. Indeed, the evidence from consumer switching behaviour in the
energy market suggests consumers may need much bigger price signals in order
to be motivated to alter their behaviour 51. Therefore policymakers and energy
firms considering introducing TOU or real time pricing may be interested in the
results in order to gauge potential take up and activity within a demand side
management scheme.
51See Giulietti et al [2014] for more detail on the evidence on consumer switching behaviour
in the British electricity market.
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Appendix
Table 9: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
Gross Demand (MW) 56717 12459
Net Demand (MW) 51858 12830
Renewable Output (MW) 4859 4267
Price £/MWh (2) 210 56.5
Price £/MWh (4) 95 27
Price £/MWh (5) 80.5 20
Price £/MWh (6) 73 15.5
Price £/MWh (7) 69 12.5
Price £/MWh (8) 66.5 10.5
Price £/MWh (10) 64 9
Price £/MWh (12) 63 8
Output rounded to 1 s.f.
Price rounded to nearest 50p. Number in parenthesis denotes the number of
firms in the market.
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Figure 18: Gross Demand 2050
Figure 19: Net Demand 2050
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Figure 20: Renewable Output 2050
Figure 21: Histogram of Gross Demand 2050
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Figure 22: Histogram of Net Demand 2050
Figure 23: Histogram of Renewable Output 2050
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Figure 24: Diurnal Demand Profile
Figure 25: Intra-Week Demand Profile
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Figure 26: Prices for 6 Firms
Figure 27: Histogram of Prices for 6 Firms
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Figure 28: Arbitrage Returns, 20MWh Capacity
Figure 29: Arbitrage Returns, 40MWh Capacity
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Figure 30: Arbitrage Returns, 60MWh Capacity
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Figure 31: Arbitrage Returns, 80MWh Capacity
Figure 32: Arbitrage Returns, 100MWh Capacity
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Figure 33: Operational Time, 20MWh Capacity
Figure 34: Operational Time, 40MWh Capacity
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Figure 35: Operational Time, 60MWh Capacity
Figure 36: Operational Time, 80MWh Capacity
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Figure 37: Operational Time, 100MWh Capacity
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Figure 38: Equilibrium Computation
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Figure 39: Household Observation Histogram
Figure 40: Distribution of annual bill change for tariff 1
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Figure 41: Distribution of annual bill change for tariff 2
Figure 42: Distribution of annual bill change for tariff 3
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Figure 43: Distribution of household electricity usage
Figure 44: Distribution of electrical appliances
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Figure 45: Distribution of annual bill change from flat-rate tariff to tariff 3 with
PED = -0.1
Figure 46: Distribution of annual bill change from flat-rate tariff to tariff 3 with
PED = -0.3
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Figure 47: Distribution of annual bill change from tariff 3 with PED = 0 to
tariff 3 with PED = -0.1
Figure 48: Distribution of annual bill change from tariff 3 with PED = 0 to
tariff 3 with PED = -0.1
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